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Abstract 
In this study, I address the status of human relationships with the contemporary sex or 
love doll by situating these relationships at the intersection between communications 
technologies and subjectivity. Critical discourse analysis of testimonials, advertising, a 
sub forum from The Doll Forum website, and photographs challenged the two prevalent 
perspectives: the surrogacy thesis, which suggests that dolls operate as stand-ins for 
absent human partners, and the commodification of sex thesis, which cast love dolls as 
masturbatory devices and their users as sexually deviant. Drawing upon critical social 
theory, particularly Sherry Turkle’s (2011) concept of the robotic moment and a 
reconfiguration of Keith Basso’s (1996) notion of interanimacy, I argue that, rather than 
supplements or surrogates, sociable technologies and objects are participants in social 
interactions, communications, and relationships. 
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Chapter 1: The Mechanical Bride and the Reification of Love. 
	  
Figure	  1:	  Day	  27/Day	  1	  (New	  In	  Box)	  
A Story: Vignettes of Infamous Mechanical Brides 
Dames de Voyage 
During the 17th century French and Spanish sailors were enduring longer voyages, and 
since women were considered bad luck on ships, men were forced to bear it alone. As a 
result of these long journeys, with voyagers confined to small quarters with only men 
aboard, the phenomena of the dames de voyage surfaced as somewhat of a resolution. 
Anthony Ferguson (2010) elaborates that “[t]hese elementary sex dolls were made from 
cloth or old clothes and would have been quite rudimentary. Imagination would have 
been critical to their use, particularly for a man isolated at sea on a long voyage” (p. 16). 
As well, there may have been a hierarchy of rank for those who were allowed to spend 
time with it, as rank and designation likely favoured more distinguished sailors. Amy 
Wolf (2006) comments on the dames de voyage, “Made of cotton and presumably held 
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together by dried cum, the dames de voyage was a hot bed of venereal diseases, and it’s 
perhaps fortunate that no specimens – or even images – exist today” (as cited in 
Ferguson, p. 16).  
In the year 1640, Renee Descartes’ daughter Francine died at the age of five from 
scarlet fever. Allegedly, the death of Descartes’ daughter weighed so heavily on him that 
he built an automaton modeled directly after Francine; he even gave it her name. The 
Queen of Sweden subsequently summoned Descartes. Accompanying him aboard the 
ship was his newly fashioned Francine. During the journey, Descartes was observed in a 
frantic search of the ship for what was presumably his missing daughter, asking the crew 
to help aid in her rescue. Members of the crew were mortified to find an extremely 
lifelike doll in Descartes’ quarters and brought it to the captain, who reportedly threw her 
overboard. Ferguson (2010) suggests that “[i]t is believed that Descartes fashioned his 
doll to explore the contemporary fascination with artificial life and the question of what it 
actually is to be human” (p. 17), though other theories of Francine’s construction can be 
found1.  
Alma Mahler’s Double 
Considered one of the foremost expressionist painters of the 20th century, Oskar 
Kokoschka entreated a dressmaker to create a doll for him. The history of this doll is 
bound to Kokoschka’s passionate love affair with Alma Mahler, widower of the famous 
composer Gustav Mahler. Kokoschka was drafted during WWI, though he returned 
shortly after having sustained an injury. Upon Kokoschka’s return he learned of Mahler’s 
new love interest. Disheartened to find that Mahler had moved on, he commissioned the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Gaukroger (2002), Descartes: an intellectual biography, for another account of the 
 	   3	  
construction of a doll modeled directly after her by, ironically enough, her dressmaker 
Hermine Moos (Ferguson, 2010, p. 20). He was found to carry her everywhere he went, 
even when attending operas and shows. He bought her clothes and underwear (p. 20). 
However the doll met a violent end. Witness Kokoschka’s own account: 
Finally, after I had drawn it and painted it over and over, I decided to do away 
with it. It managed to cure me completely of my passion. So I gave it a big 
champagne party with chamber music … When dawn broke – I was quite drunk, 
as was everyone else – I beheaded it out in the garden and broke a bottle of red 
wine over its head (as cited in Morrison, 2003). 
 
The Real Doll 
In 2010, Tom Ricard writes in his Real Doll Testimonial2:  
We are some days further and I can say: it is getting better and better. The things 
you discover … The things you can and must do: go shopping for her, taking care 
of her (washing, powdering), dressing her up, moving her, … Kissing her, 
caressing her, cuddle her, laying next to her, holding her hand, brushing her wig, 
too much to mention (Tom Ricard, January 10, 2010).  
 
In spending time with this commercially produced doll, Tom finds that she brings an 
uncanny sense of company to the room. He notes that he enjoyed his life while single, but 
found that the thought of having a doll could make a difference. He admits that even the 
pictures he saw before ‘uncrating’ her fulfilled all of his expectations, but “[i]n fact, no 
picture can capture her beauty and her sweetness. I am so happy to have her with me!” 
(Testimonials: Tell us about your doll!). Like Tom, an anonymous contributor to the Real 
Doll Testimonials was single before ordering his doll: Vanessa. The moment he 
‘uncrates’ Vanessa is a spectacular event, one in which he will never forget. He is 
exuberant about his new relationship and his appreciation for her. In enjoying Vanessa he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Retrieved from https://secure.realdoll.com/testamonials/, on February 6, 2013. It should 
be noted that as of June, 2013, the website has changed and they have updated their 
testimonials.  
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is finding that “it’s not about sex alone. Dolls are fun and nice to look at, you can enjoy 
their presence” (ibid).  
By briefly introducing short vignettes that depict notable iterations of love dolls, I 
do not intend to provide a history of love dolls; other authors, such as Ferguson, have 
produced such histories. Admittedly, I have introduced only a few instances, each of 
which is remarked upon and documented in literature presumably because of the social-
historical prominence of their creators, with the exception of the latter, commercial 
instance. The vignettes are presented here to illustrate that love dolls are not a new 
phenomenon and that, while they may appear to serve a sexual function, the significance 
that they hold for those who keep them has always been ambiguous. The dames de 
voyage suggests a seemingly obvious explanation of the effigy’s purpose, to serve 
primarily as a surrogate of carnal invention. However, even in this elementary condition, 
access to the dolls may have been one of several ways that voyagers marked and 
performed relative privilege when removed from the more stable social spheres on land 
(Ferguson, 2010, p. 16). Thus, we might infer social class stratified the level of access to 
the dames while abroad, granting higher-ranking officers an alibi for the comforts of 
home.  
Although Descartes’ doll was presumably more than a replica, perhaps a stand-in 
for his daughter, it exhibits his mechanical prowess and displays his melancholic 
disposition over her passing. In his ingenuity over material construction, Descartes also 
insists upon a reversal of the ‘natural’ order of things. In his time, it might be assumed 
that he had harnessed the powers of nature or God in his ability to recreate his daughter – 
a profound expression of power for the time period. If we are to believe the anecdote of 
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the urgent search on the ship in response to Descartes’ insistence that his daughter had 
gone missing, it raises the question of why he would put on such a ‘play’. Was it to incite 
a real panic over the prospect of a missing child, his missing child, to dramatize socially 
his melancholic feelings? Perhaps, in his sorrow, he was confused and could not 
distinguish between the mechanical Francine and the deceased flesh and blood Francine. 
Or, yet another possibility is that he was not at all confused. Is it possible that, for 
Descartes, the doll was another – neither replica, nor spectrely substitution – daughter; a 
daughter produced through his own means of technological reproduction, whom he might 
have conceived as no less significant and no less endearing than a human child? 
Kokoschka’s replication of Mahler has clearer circumstances that are suggestive 
of the motivational force behind her creation. Having been deserted by his former lover, 
who married the prominent Bauhaus architect Walter Gropius soon afterwards, he 
consigns the construction of an exact replication of Mahler. In this, he is able to ensure 
that she fulfills his every need. She is present to accompany him to the theatre, on 
carriage rides through town, and to parties. She is, for all intents and purposes, engrossed 
in his world and his world alone. As he tires of painting her in repetitious artistic studies, 
of including her in his self-portraits, and keeping her for his own purposes (perhaps of 
self-reconstruction), he celebrates his complete fulfillment of mastery over her by 
beheading her at a party and covering her in wine, in view of the other guests.3  
In the story of Tom Ricard and his doll, there are circumstances that demarcate 
this relationship from the others. Ricard purchased a doll from a distributor, but it is quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Roos (2005), “Oskar Kokoschka’s sex toy: the women and the doll who conceived 
the artist”, Modernism/ Modernity 12(2), pp. 291-309 for another analysis of 
Kokoschka’s doll. 
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obvious that his doll is mass-produced, though not fully standardized. Real Dolls are 
designed and produced in flexible, post-Fordist arrangements. As with other commodities 
produced in a post-Fordist fashion, they are poised to meet niche demands and the desires 
of consumers who seek commodities that emphasize lifestyle over use value (Callinicos, 
1989, p. 134). The RealDoll company’s designers, Abyss Creations, are able to 
manufacture individual characteristics with specifications of body type, eye color, hair 
color and length, breast size, skin color, pubic hair, vaginal dimensions, and so on. The 
dolls are customizable, made-to-order, synthetic creations that are so elaborate that, at a 
glance, they could readily be mistaken for real people.  
From voyagers’ D.I.Y. makeshift dolls of the 17th century and artisan 
interpretations and displays of technical prowess to produce life-like figures to the 
contemporary production of the commercially available love doll, does the significance 
of such dolls extend beyond their presumed function as substitutes for human 
companionship? The purpose of dolls has generally been explained with reference to the 
assumed intentions of their respective creators, and, while those intentions are not 
transparent, they appear to be more varied and contradictory than explanations focused 
on masturbation imply. The contemporary post-Fordist production of these dolls 
challenges how we can conceive of this relationship. From the dames de voyage to the 
commissioning of the Mahler doll, we are able to see hints towards an emergent shift in 
the production of the dolls: the one who makes the doll is no longer necessarily the one 
who keeps the doll. This break becomes more pronounced with Abyss Creation’s 
RealDolls. RealDolls are commodities that stand to bring profit to their producers, but 
what is their function for, and value to, those who purchase and keep the dolls? We might 
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proceed by privileging the common-sense understanding of the relationship and assume 
that the doll is a high-tech substitute for a human partner and that it is primarily used to 
fulfill sexual desire. But, perhaps the emphasis on the dolls’ sexual use functions 
obscures other significant aspects of this phenomenon. I set out to answer the following 
questions: In what ways do commercially produced dolls appear in circulated imagery 
produced by humans who keep them? How do humans who keep dolls speak about the 
dolls and themselves relationally? How is the growing prevalence of commercially 
produced love dolls consistent or inconsistent with contemporary shifts in relationships 
and technology?  
Dolls in the Posthuman Age 
Love dolls, or realistic sex dolls, such as Real Dolls, constitute a booming niche industry. 
Their appearance in films such as Lars and the Real Girl (2007) and in television shows 
such as TLC’s My Strange Addiction (2011) attest to their emergent salience in popular 
culture. While the film Lars and the Real Girl normalizes a relationship with a love doll 
by illustrating its capacity to act as a social and romantic surrogate for the alienated 
protagonist, whose idiosyncratic habits and awkward social skills stand as obstacles to 
normative connections with others, relationships with love dolls are subtly pathologized 
as deviant through their sensational treatment in reality shows, such as My Strange 
Addiction. In Lars and the Real Girl, Lars learns from his doll Bianca how to be in a 
relationship. After Lars’ small town community overcomes their initial moral shock and 
negative criticism of Lars and Bianca’s relationship, his family members and neighbours 
seem to bond with his doll Bianca, and eventually it appears that they need her socially as 
much as he does. Once Lars is socially educated through his tumultuous relationship with 
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Bianca, he is able to exchange her for a “real”, human girlfriend, and presumably live 
happily ever after. This scenario presents a normalizing trajectory for a human-doll 
relationship in our present age, while the television show My Strange Addiction depicts 
people who keep dolls, despite or in conjunction with their intact long-term relationships, 
as exhibiting aberrant and irrational perversions. These two different popular cultural 
narratives are consistent with the dominant discourse on dolls in scholarly literature. On 
the one hand, dolls are understood as surrogates for lost loves or for the inexperienced. 
On the other hand, dolls have been cast primarily as masturbatory objects and sexual 
commodities akin to pornography in their objectivizing potential. My research into the 
discourses surrounding contemporary dolls suggests that these dolls provide a site for 
working through cultural assumptions and expectations about relationships, but the 
humans who keep dolls often do not privilege human-to-human relationships as either 
ideal or more worthy than their human-doll relationships, which often extend beyond 
their erotic aspects.   
In what follows, I will interrogate the assumption that love dolls are primarily 
sexual aids treated merely as objects to be manipulated, while also exploring the 
limitations of the surrogacy thesis. By drawing from posthumanist theory, which is 
underpinned by poststructuralist epistemology and ontology, I will show that 
contemporary love dolls invite humans into relationships that offer something more than, 
or something other than, surrogates for human partners. My central argument is that 
emergent and interanimating relationships between humans and objects, such as love 
dolls, retrench material presence in a digitally-mediated age and are consistent with our 
present comfort with the mere appearance of emotion in what Sherry Turkle (2011) has 
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called the robotic moment. To the extent that the shape that some of these relationships 
take may respond to dramatic shifts brought about by the dematerializing effects on 
social interaction of digitalization, simulation, and robotization, they are not anomalous. 
Rather, these relationships are poised at the intersection of technology and subjectivity 
and they can inform how we anticipate and critique the conditions in which we are 
currently immersed.  
I have used critical discourse analysis to examine the following: Debates on the 
iDollator discussion board that negotiate the appropriate language to describe humans 
who keep dolls; Real Doll testimonials; an advertisement by the company Kanajo Toys; 
and photographic portraits of dolls, including one commissioned professional portrait of a 
human-doll couple. Drawing upon these materials, I will elaborate upon the discursive 
complexities of love dolls to show that, those who keep love dolls appear to be engaged 
in what is for them the mutual performance of a relationship. These relations at times 
reinforce socially recognizable norms that govern expected conduct within a romantic 
relationship and sometimes signal a melancholic fantasy of the chivalrous 
heteronormative relationship associated with scripts of masculinity, which emphasized 
mastery and control, that have given way over the past few decades to “multiple and 
shifting realities about masculinity” and produced a social perception of a masculinity 
crisis in Western nations (Atkinson, 2011, p. 9). Simultaneously, however, these 
relationships radically displace these norms and may lend qualified support for David 
Levy’s (2007) controversial assertion that genuine relationships with, and even marriage 
to, robots may be commonplace by the middle of this century. 
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 Conceptually, my argument depends upon my reworking of Keith Basso’s (1996) 
concept of interanimation, as well as Turkle’s historical observation that we have entered 
into a robotic moment. Basso uses the concept of interanimation to underpin the mutual 
production of place and subjectivity in an ongoing process of meaning making that is 
forged in affect and the senses. To the extent that place is considered to be neither 
animate, nor an agent, it can be extended to my analysis of human-doll relationships. The 
meanings of these relationships unfold over time and subsequently make and remake the 
relational identities of the participants. Of particular significance to my argument will be 
the affective commitments associated with the caregiving that these dolls require and the 
sensorial impact of their obdurate material presence. I will return to unpack the 
implications of this later in the discussion.   
 Turkle (2011) argues that we have entered into a robotic moment. For Turkle, the 
concept of the robotic moment acknowledges that the contexts in which we express and 
perceive emotional attachments have been drastically altered. Turkle’s research observing 
children, the elderly, and families interact over extended periods with sociable robots 
illustrates that, increasingly, the mere performance of emotion is enough for us. We have 
become comfortable with the inauthentic displays of emotion expressed by sociable 
robots and have recast the disingenuous as, if not genuine, at least good enough. We lose 
‘touch’ with ‘reality’, diluting our meaning making process, and with each new advent of 
sociable technology we stretch what little genuine effort remains for fostering human-to-
human relationships.  
Since a sociable robot is one that calls upon us to extend toward it a form of care, 
Turkle’s research involves advanced robots designed at MIT, but she also observed this 
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robotic demand for care two decades ago in popular children’s toys, such as the 
Tamogotchi and Furby. We can generalize Turkle’s observations beyond the strict 
contexts of human-robot interactions, however, if we take into account how we have been 
engaging in conversational interactions with algorithms for some time. For instance, we 
long ago became accustomed to automated telephone calls and can now depend upon 
complex sociable technology, such as iPhone’s dedicated and friendly personal assistant 
Siri, to aid us in daily routines by requesting help using the same communicative forms 
and similar requisite etiquette that we would use with a human companion. The historical 
concept of the robotic moment suggests that these practices have altered us and that we 
are socialized for deeper relationships with sociable objects. Also, while toys like Furby 
asked us to care for it, Siri offers to take care of us, revealing a growing reciprocity in 
human to sociable technology relations. 
Marshall McLuhan ([1964]1995) argued that every time a society adopts a new 
technological medium that accelerates both power and speed, two things occur. First, new 
social arrangements and values are required, as the old ones cannot be supported by the 
new medium. Second, the sensorial capacities of bodies are extended, truncated, or likely 
a combination of both. With respect to the first point, Turkle’s postulation of the robotic 
moment suggests not only a greater comfort with the performance of emotion but a 
growing preference for it. She notes that her research subjects expressed greater trust in 
the more comprehensive knowledge of robots, who have large databases upon which to 
draw, than in human companions, whose limited experience is increasingly perceived to 
be a deficit in relationships (p. 51).  
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In response to the second point above, if we accept McLuhan’s observations, the 
relations between time, space, and bodies have always been under reconfiguration, but 
this reconfiguration is accelerated in the digital and robotic age. Our relationships and 
connective ties with one another are largely mediated by rapidly advancing 
communications technologies. Our relational practices and exchanges are becoming 
‘dematerialized’, where technological acceleration increasingly mediates and extends our 
communicative and sensorial reach and dematerializes our intimate experiences. Today, 
so many of our expressions are encoded digitally (Hayles, 1999) and never expressed in 
the immediate presence of their recipients. For instance, it is more or less commonplace 
to initiate and emotionally accelerate intense relationships via texting. It is increasingly 
acceptable to end a relationship via text and it is not inconceivable that some 
relationships are commenced and terminated via a change in relationship status on 
Facebook.  
Advancing communications technologies are outpacing our norms (as McLuhan’s 
argument from the 1960s has already suggested), as well as our emotional consciousness. 
As Turkle’s observations suggest, we are becoming more comfortable with the absence 
of real emotion. Even when immersed in emotional connections, it seems that social 
media provides the platforms for dematerialized negotiations of messy courtships and 
break-ups. Unintentional facial expressions, tears, wavering voices, stammering 
sentences, and so on no longer need to be vulnerable to exposure as they are in 
materialized encounters. Web 2.0 Culture provides the social-technical infrastructure to 
abbreviate or to bypass messy face-to-face communications.  
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N. Katherine Hayles has observed that the move towards dematerialization stems 
from “an epistemic shift toward pattern/randomness and away from presence/absence” 
(1999, p. 29). This shift is not new, as Hayles has observed it even in the rise of 
telegraphy (2012), and it suggests not only that our communicative practices are 
changing along with technologies but also that we are in the midst of an entrenching 
“struggle to define the place of the human in relation to digital technologies” (2012, p. 
170). Perhaps we are losing our ability to be intimate in immediate co-presence and 
instead reach out to smartphones for something “real”, as we have fostered a cultural 
atrophy of touch. Jean Baudrillard attempted to shock his French readers back in 1981 
with this accusation: “People no longer look at each other, but there are institutes for that. 
They no longer touch each other, but there is contactotherapy. They no longer walk, but 
they go jogging, etc.” (Baudrillard, [1981] 1994, p. 13). Perhaps Baudrillard’s radical 
claim that we exist in a desert of the real has been realized so exactly that it has become 
non-sensical less for its obscurity than for its anachronistic appearance in our present 
predicament. 
My argument runs against two prevalent perspectives that could be mobilized to 
understand relationships with contemporary love dolls: the surrogacy thesis and the 
commodification of sex thesis. First, in digital media scholarship that addresses identity 
and social interactions, there is a tendency to ascribe to digitally mediated interactions on 
social media platforms the potential to intervene in a productive way in an individual’s 
social situation (Adler & Adler, 2008; Wood & Ward, 2010).  The surrogacy thesis 
suggests that interactions in digital social spheres substitute for or enhance “real life” 
social experience. Social exchanges with avatars, online identities, algorithms, and so on 
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substitute for companions that are absent in the individual’s face-to-face social life or 
provide a safe training ground to develop social skills that can later be used to remedy, or 
to initiate more successful, “real life” relationships.  
The surrogacy thesis appears in some of the doll literature as well to argue that the 
doll is a ‘stand-in’ or can be considered in lieu of the absent partner. Marquard Smith’s 
(2013) book-length historical study of erotic dolls only partially engages with a version 
of the surrogacy thesis because he focuses on dolls as forms of modern material culture 
that are understood in an oscillation between substitutional stand-ins and independent 
things in themselves (p. 68). Drawing from art history and social theory, Smith shows 
how these dolls are simultaneously religious, commodity, and sexual fetishes. Therefore, 
Smith’s concerns are historical, cultural, and largely ontological to extend conceptually 
far beyond the limitations suggested by the pragmatics of the surrogacy thesis that 
attempts to find pragmatic use of mediated objects. Other research, however, provides 
more explicit surrogacy arguments with respect to love dolls.  
In a psychological study designed to outline the demographics of sex doll-owners, 
Sarah Valverde’s (2012) conclusions emphasize the surrogacy potential of dolls for grief, 
safe sex, differently abled bodies, for people residing in remote areas, as well as for the 
alleviation of boredom. Yet, Valverde’s survey found nothing particularly unusual about 
the social and sexual opportunities available for those who responded. For Valverde, 
“doll-owners are not only employed and educated, but also do not appear to suffer 
significantly from major mental illness and appear satisfied with their lives” (p. 35). So, 
while dolls may have therapeutic potential, this is not necessarily what accounts for their 
use.  
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Meghan Boiteau’s (2011) study of The Doll Forum online argues that posters on 
that forum redefine sexuality, gender, and relationships, although “they do so within 
specific frameworks to maintain legitimacy” (p. 95). Boiteau casts the doll as a surrogate 
for the imagined willing woman that, in dominant culture, is the object of the “girl hunt” 
(90). To the extent that the other participants, mostly men, of The Doll Forum are the 
audience (p. 87) for posts announcing new dolls, depicting dolls in poses, and describing 
relationships with dolls, Boiteau sees the doll as mediating homosocial relationships 
within the forum (p. 90).  
To some extent the surrogacy that dolls can provide makes common sense, 
however, this view is limited when accounting for many of the discussions that occur 
within The Doll Forum that demonstrate that many individuals who own dolls have either 
chosen the doll over a human relationship or use a doll in tandem with romantic 
partnerships and being married. This requires a bit more investigation, and some 
contextually and theoretically informed speculation, as to why one would choose the doll 
over a human or as a complement to a human. Turkle’s (2011) notion of the robotic 
moment would suggest that the relationship with dolls provides a less complicated 
relationship at the cost of the idiosyncrasies and risks of pain that define a human-to-
human relationship. Levy (2007) would see this openness to the simulation of emotion as 
the next step in human-to-nonhuman relationships.  
Second, it is possible to conflate the use of love dolls with pornography to 
mobilize a critique that emphasizes the use of love dolls as the commodification of sex, 
characterized in terms of the passivity and accommodation of the consumer’s desire. Yet, 
the love doll seems to offer more than a robust masturbation device. Prevalent themes in 
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testimonials and doll forums suggest that the users do not necessarily keep the dolls for 
merely sexual purposes. Returned to in greater length later, Chris Hedges (2009) makes 
the assertion that the doll is an extension of pornography; it is compliant and ready to be 
used (p. 85). I think this overstates the sexual use of dolls, and arguments surrounding 
pornography are not easily mapped onto the ways in which those who keep dolls 
characterize their relationships with them. Although there are similarities, the mediums 
are completely different. Pornography stimulates arousal through a non-corporeal image, 
and is predestined to ultimately end with the ‘money shot’, whereas the doll is enlisted to 
demand almost a caregiving role rather than being resigned to masturbatory servitude. In 
as much as one may be able to say that the love doll is only a commodification of love or 
sex, it appears that, even though a purchasable item, the doll is discursively so much 
more. Relationships with dolls provide a site in which many of our existing social norms 
about how we conduct ourselves within a romantic relationship are represented and re-
worked, whereas pornography stresses the sexual act apart from other aspects of 
intimacy. Further, if relationships between humans and love dolls are situated within the 
broader shifts in communication and relationships in an increasingly posthuman age, 
these two approaches to interpreting the social significance of love dolls begin to appear 
reductive.  
Situating Posthumanism  
In what follows I outline theoretical literature that provides initial context to the post-
structural epistemology and ontology that has guided my analysis of the doll and its 
surrounding discourse. This foregrounding helps to unpack the posthumanist perspective 
that will inform my argument. My argument acknowledges that conceptions of self and 
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our relationships are not independent of the communications technologies upon which we 
rely, but the escalated manufacture of new technologies has presumably made the process 
of realignment more palpable. The emergent relationships with dolls that I seek to 
analyze could be interpreted as the private manifestations of social problems, such as 
loneliness, objectification, and so on. I note, however, that human-doll intimacies are 
situated within new relationships between humans and technology and that they are 
consistent with historical shifts observed in critical social theory that is concerned with 
the changing relationships between representation and reality as well as with the shifting 
status of the commodity. In what follows, I will consider theoretical contributions made 
by the Frankfurt School, Guy Debord, and Jean Baudrillard that are relevant to these 
problems and that roughly anticipate posthumanism, which unsettles a number of taken 
for granted categories, especially that of the human.  
The Culture Industry  
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1993) proposed the concept of the culture 
industry in their critique of American mass consumer culture in the 1940s. By placing the 
words culture and industry together into a compound construction, Horkheimer and 
Adorno suggested that business industry, as well as the techniques of production 
(Taylorism, in particular) necessary to industrial capitalism, had degraded culture. They 
highlighted a progressive blurring between the rhythms of labour and leisure through the 
standardization of commodity forms, including those to which the labourer turns at the 
end of the workday: music and films. They proposed that the culture industry was not 
only a manipulation of the means of production, but also an ideological means of 
production. The consequence of the culture industry is an ontological split between what 
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is conceived of as our given reality and what it might actually be. The ideological 
structure of standardization replicates industry needs in the desires of the labourer. It is 
used to create the appearance of ‘natural’ demand, which results in the manufacturing of 
consent; we are led to believe that choice and agency exist and are amplified in industrial 
capitalism. Further, consumer demand was a delusion; any demand was both 
manufactured and artificial. They elaborate:  
Furthermore, it is claimed that standards were based in the first place on 
consumers’ needs, and for that reason were accepted with so little resistance. The 
result is the circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the 
system grows ever stronger. (1993, p. 30)  
 
The excerpt points towards a revolving model of the culture industry and the individual 
marked by false needs, as consumers are led to believe that their desires for certain 
commodities are in fact their own. In actuality, desires are manufactured by creating 
commodities and ideas that are given the “stamp” of uniqueness and individuality (p. 30). 
To meet mass consumer ‘demand’, the commodity itself must be mass-produced, but 
with the mark of what Adorno and Horkheimer called pseudo-individualization, which 
gives the appearance of originality to the item to hide its standardization. While the 
concept of pseudo-individualization applies to the illusion of the object’s uniqueness, it 
perhaps follows from the assumption that we believe that we are able to express ourselves 
through the objects that we buy or the clothes that we wear. But therein lay the crux of 
the issue: the commodity form is an object of suspicion for Horkheimer and Adorno 
because it threatens to separate us from our presumed true nature and from a reality with 
which we have lost touch. The painting of the Eiffel Tower in your home could very well 
be in thousands of homes, and the notion that this piece of art is a reflection of your 
unique personality becomes a generality alongside the culture industry’s promise to 
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mirror personalities – our true selves – with commodities. The culture industry provides 
that ideology and maintains the illusion that prevents the consumer from traversing that 
phantasm so that commodities will continue to re-produce this false consciousness in 
multitudes.  
The creation of illusion can be exemplified through film, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1993) find that, although the narrative is fictitious and standardized, the 
scenarios and experiences of the protagonist are depicted to encourage the viewer to 
equate it with reality (p. 34). The film then is productive in the sense that it creates a 
reality that seems so readily true for us. We have been trained to react automatically and, 
regardless of the specifics of the movie’s narrative, its presumed consistency with real 
life leaves us, if not satisfied, at least still firm in the belief that we are free, as “[t]he 
culture industry as a whole has moulded men as a type, unfailingly reproduced in every 
product” (p. 34).  
Here we reach a paradox, however, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1993) find: 
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually 
promises… the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory: 
all it actually confirms is that the real point will never be reached, that the diner 
must be satisfied with the menu. (p. 38) 
 
The culture industry, this machine that produces and manufactures our demands for us, 
always leaves us in a perpetual state of want. The way in which this works is to make the 
consumer feel as if all their needs can be fulfilled, “but that those needs should be so 
predetermined that he feels himself to be the eternal consumer” (p. 40). To the extent that 
the culture industry offers images of the self to which consumers readily identify but can 
never realize, the consumer has become reliant upon advertising and mass media and 
complicit with the culture industry. 
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 Having briefly discussed Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of the culture 
industry, I want to draw attention to the critical suspicion that their analysis demonstrates 
toward commodities and the complicity that commodities have in the production of 
illusory reality on this account. The concept of the culture industry identifies what we 
might consider to be creative commodities with industrial capitalism. The emphasis in 
this critique is less on the profits that are derived from the endless consumption of 
commodities that Adorno and Horkheimer describe but on the power that standardized 
commodities have in producing subjects’ obedience in the blurring of leisure, as a site of 
desire, with labour. To this end, the commodities to which Adorno and Horkheimer give 
special attention – entertainment forms – can be understood as technologies in their own 
right. To the extent that these commodities rearrange and realign the desires and 
consciousness of consumers by mimicking the rhythm of labour at a sensorial level and 
blurring the reality of the assembly line with the perceived reality of intimate everyday 
life, the Frankfurt School concept of the culture industry implicitly warns of a slow 
merging of human consciousness with the logic and materiality of technological forms. 
Society and the Spectacle  
Similarily, Guy Debord (1983) offers a critique of consumer culture through his notion of 
the ‘spectacle.’ The concept of the spectacle is similar to that of the culture industry in 
that the spectacle is an ever promising but never fulfilling entity that produces desire but 
it also produces feelings of privation when subsistence needs have been met. The term 
privation occurs several times throughout the first two chapters, as Debord shows that the 
consumption of mass-produced commodities is redefined as necessary to ensuring 
survival. Debord writes in his 44th thesis: 
 	  21	  
The spectacle is a permanent opium war which aims to make people identify 
goods with commodities and satisfaction with survival that increases according to 
its own laws… If there is nothing increasing survival, if there is no point where it 
might stop growing, this is not because it is beyond privation, but because it is 
enriched privation. 
 
Here, the “permanent opium war” is the process of not only marketing to consumers, but 
also creating an addictive association with survival by presenting the commodity as 
something so much more than it is.  
At the surface level, Debord finds that the commodity seems simple, as it is only 
an object to be traded, “while on the contrary it is so complex and so full of metaphysical 
subtleties” (Thesis 35). Part of the purpose of the spectacle is to place the consumer under 
a false consciousness, to create the consumer as complicit to the demands that the 
spectacle provides through this “opium war.” This can be summarized in thesis 21: 
To the extent that necessity is socially dreamed, the dream becomes necessary. 
The spectacle is the nightmare of imprisoned modern society which ultimately 
expresses nothing more than its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of 
sleep. (emphasis added) 
 
This last italicized portion offers us insight into the similarities between the ontological 
split demonstrated, on the one hand, in the Frankfurt School’s concept of the culture 
industry and in Debord’s concept of the spectacle. The spectacle as a guardian positions 
itself ideologically, as it masks the truth of privation in industrialized capitalism where 
basic needs are met and new needs must be actively produced. Survival as a natural 
problem that can be remedied with the purchase of a new automobile is cast as a social 
construct here, manufactured (to borrow from Adorno and Horkheimer) to render our 
critical reason dormant and complicit. For Debord, residing within the society of the 
spectacle changes the status of our very existence, as he notes in thesis 7, from being to 
 	  22	  
having to appearing. The negotiation of our actuality occurs through our practices of 
consumption – through being the “eternal consumer.”  
Through commodity fetishism, the commodity itself becomes less important than 
what it signifies. This signification is the actualization of appearing through consumption, 
appearing within the spectacle. It is important here to note that the spectacle is not simply 
an entity out there, it is a social relationship among people expressed through images 
(Thesis 4). Consequently, “reality rises up within the spectacle, and the spectacle is real” 
(Thesis 8). The ontological split produced by false consciousness becomes blurrier and 
the split begins to grey; the demarcation between false and class consciousness begin to 
blend together, since the way in which we discern reality is clouded. Further, this 
suggests that, if manufactured, mediated reality has overcome immediate reality, trading 
real social relationships for relationships between commodities and producing mediated 
appearances rather than immediate beings, and then we can no longer access the 
immediacy of social relations. This predicament anticipates Jean Baudrillard’s concept of 
hyperreality.  
The Precession of Simulacra  
Having close theoretical ties to the Frankfurt School and post-Marxism, Baudrillard 
([1981] 1994) interrogates the lineage and ubiquity of consumer culture and the 
symbolism bound up in it. He finds that the history and lineage of commodity exchange 
have led us to a point in time in which pure abstraction has been realized and embodied 
in a state of ‘hyperreality.’ Following the industrial revolution and the technological 
advancements that occurred during this time, we gained the capacity to duplicate 
commodities at a staggering rate. Having appreciation for, but departing from, the 
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Frankfurt School, he inverts the original production-consumption binary, shrouding 
production in consumption. Baudrillard radicalizes the notion of commodity fetishism by 
arguing that the commodity has become so much more than simply an object of interest; 
it contains or ‘is’ a form of communication, manifesting into a sign (Mendoza, 2010, p. 
47).  
In examining the symbolic meanings system behind commodity exchange, 
Baudrillard suggests that the meanings have fractured over time; that the sign of the 
commodity is unstable. As a result he has constructed a genealogical map of the orders of 
simulation and representation in which (from the beginning to the end) they lose touch 
with the reality that constructed them: 
it is a reflection of a profound reality 
it masks and denatures a profound reality 
it masks the abstract of a profound reality 
it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum 
(Baudrillard, [1981] 1994, p. 6) 
 
Following this, we can compare the lineage of the simulacrum with that of the semiotic 
concepts signifier and signified, respectively. Through imitation, and then mechanical 
reproduction and counterfeits, simulations or representations attempt to mirror a given 
reality, and the problem resides in demarcating good and distorted reflections. In the 
second order that masks an abstract reality, which Baudrillard associates with mass 
production of objects that have no original, as they are modeled after a design or a 
prototype but not an already existing real entity, we find that the notion of representation 
no longer makes sense. From the fixed signs in the symbolic order to the mass production 
of abstract reality in the second order of simulation, we see that the ‘natural’ associations 
between things comes to be distorted, so that meaning is multiple and in flux, much like 
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Roland Barthes’ ([1952] 1972) notion of “myth.” In the third order, the simulation has no 
ties to reality; it has broken from its original signified and is now a floating signifier. 
Finally, the simulacrum is a replica of the simulation. Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) asserts, 
“Where as representation attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false 
representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a 
simulacrum” (p. 6). By this process we find ourselves interacting with only simulations, 
creating and recreating them in a circular system with no referent to an original or 
authentic reality. Baudrillard insists that the simulation is not a pretend, dissimulate, or 
counterfeit, as each of these would leave the reality principle whole (p. 3). In essence, 
there is no room here for the concept of ideology, at least in the traditional Marxist sense. 
For Baudrillard “[i]t is no longer a question of a false representation of reality but of 
concealing the fact that the reality principle is no longer real” (p. 12-13).  
This could be exemplified by Debord’s (1983) “enriching privation”, in which our 
species being is obfuscated by abstract needs. The consequence of this is that we act upon 
these false and manufactured needs, but, for Baudrillard, we have gone so far as to lose 
touch with what needs are in fact ‘real’ so that he will not, as Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Debord all do, even reinforce the line between false and real, since all that we are left 
with are the manufactured needs. Here, the idea of ‘false’ is no longer considered, the 
binary between true and false has imploded since there is no true reality to which we may 
dream of returning. Our representation of needs has surpassed that of parody or caricature 
leaving us with only with the simulation.  
In recognizing this, Baudrillard (1996) argues that consumption has led to “an 
active endeavor in ‘the manipulation of signs’ towards the creation of the ‘person’” (p. 
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218, as cited in Mendoza, 2010, p. 48). The commodity’s sign is used to identify with the 
status of an individual, making that individual into an object, and consequently making 
the object personalized or subjectified. This is what Baudrillard (1996) identifies as 
“personalization”, through objectification of the subject and the subjectification of the 
object: 
The point is that the consumption of décor or of a car, the consumption of a 
commodity in general, is not consumption based upon a need, which in Marx is 
formalized as the Use-value. It is a consumption of what it signifies and how the 
consumer consuming the sign is integrated within the system (as cited in 
Mendoza, 2010, p. 49).  
 
Take for example the green movement that attempts to promote leaving the smallest 
carbon footprint possible and then juxtapose the use of plastic water bottles. In the case 
where you decide not to purchase water from plastic bottles, this act, even though 
pragmatically it involves the non-consumption of a commodity, still occurs within a 
system of exchange and signifies another form of consumption, that of the green 
movement. How is this? In Baudrillardian terms, “everything is reduced to sign” 
(Mendoza, p. 55). With this, I believe Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) points to the “horizon of 
the event” (p. 83). This notion suggests that we have met an impassable horizon, “beyond 
that nothing takes place that has meaning for us” (p. 83).  
By producing the paradigm of hyperreality, although he may not agree with the 
term paradigm, he has radicalized not only the way in which we come to know but how 
we know. In this sense, the ontological and epistemological foundations have been 
removed, for “it is always a false problem to wish to restore the truth beneath the 
simulacrum” (Baudrillard, [1981] 1994, p. 23). For Baudrillard, the finality and end of 
production (and likely that of modernity) is that the traditional production-consumption 
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binary now only consists of consumption; production is an attempt to reestablish a reality 
that will forever elude it. 
If we follow Baudrillard, the question of representation – the question of whether 
the spectacle or the culture industry offer reflections of the surrounding society – is 
obsolete. For that reason, we can also no longer say that our social relations are mediated 
or structured through our social media and social technologies, for these technologies 
have (for all intents and purposes) become participants in social relations. Social relations 
are now produced as very tangible objects; our sense of the social is restricted to the 
simulated models within which we act. If, without our computers, cell-phones, facebook, 
and twitter, we feel ‘cut-off’ from the world, perhaps Baudrillard’s once apocalyptic 
characterizations have just become banal observations; we feel cut off from the world 
without these technologies and platforms because the simulations that they provide are 
more “real” than what they presumably represent.  
In the end, Baudrillard is no more positive about the status of commodities than 
are Adorno, Horkheimer, and Debord, but his characterization of hyperreality as pure 
simulation marking the end of ideology, truth, and authentic being suggests our deep and 
relational entanglement with commodities and technologies. To the extent that the social 
theorists discussed in this section insist that commodities have become intertwined with 
our being or appearance, it makes sense to consider them technologies of the individual, 
as already suggested. These observations provide an opening for a brief introduction to 
posthumanism that will remain focused on the concerns already set out in this section.  
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Posthumanism 
In response to Baudrillard’s bleak outlook, Toffoletti (2007) finds a glimmer of hope in 
his notion of hyperreality, and she suggests that it opened the way for the arrival of the 
posthuman. Toffoletti engages the long-standing tensions and speculations about the 
‘postmodern’ condition. These debates confronted the question of whether we have 
entered into a period marked by a fractured, decentered, and eroded reality. The term 
postmodern has had negative connotations. For critics, the concept and the theorists 
(many of whom have been unwillingly corralled under the postmodern umbrella) have 
rendered us without tools of resistance or agency, and produced only a sense of futility. 
Not so for Toffoletti. 
Some of the major overarching criticism aimed at the postmodern pointed to 
poststructural and postmodern approaches that decenter the body and blur bodily 
experience with semiotics. Toffoletti (2007) recognizes the pessimism that Baudrillard 
has imparted, however, she has found a way to utilize his theory of simulation for her 
feminist project. She argues that feminism may benefit from exposure to Baudrillard: 
“What feminism stands to gain from exposing the operations of the reality principle is the 
possibility for new imaginings of subjectivity that exceed traditional formulations of the 
body and identity” (p. 49). The longstanding debate leads back to that of the Cartesian 
man, which separated the mind and body. Some feminist readings of Baudrillard suggest 
that he privileges the mind through his poststructural theory, and consequently his work 
has lost favor in feminism for reducing and ignoring raw bodily experience. This, it 
would seem, is Toffoletti’s departure point, but she aims neither to remove the bodily 
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experience nor to re-center the body in this dialogue. Rather, Toffoletti aims to 
reformulate it through the posthuman.  
In Cyborgs and Barbie Dolls Toffoletti (2007) unpacks the ongoing debate of 
what constitutes the posthuman. She interrogates the negative focus on the prefix ‘post’, 
as if it suggests that we are losing something integral to humanity, that there is an essence 
of what it means to be human, and that the inherent ‘nugget’ of our existence has 
vanished in the face of our current technological age (p. 12). She combats this 
presumption by showing that such critiques reveal universalist or liberal assumptions 
about the human. While these assumptions usually exclude women, a feminist critique 
that adopts and amends this perspective would be guilty of proposing an inherent or 
universally normative ontology for women.	   Toffoletti is motivated in this work to 
‘debunk’ universal notions, and to interrogate what it means to exist, experience, and 
understand what it means to live today (p. 13). In this sense, Toffoletti follows Sherry 
Turkle in finding that a subject is neither unified nor fixed, “but constantly formulated 
and reconstructed through her/his diverse relationships with computer culture, to be 
posthuman is to construct a notion of self within a culture of simulation, virtuality and the 
digital” (p. 27-28). 
The radical characterization Baudrillard offers of our contemporary hyperreal 
condition significantly alters how we conceive of our daily lives, and it is that radical 
shift that Toffoletti wants to hail into this conversation. In this condition, the order of 
simulation, where dichotomies and dualities have imploded, there is no longer any 
potential for dialectical thinking, and the subject and object become indistinguishable 
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from one another. It is here, at this point of indistinguishability, that Toffoletti argues the 
posthuman emerges, “[i]t is an effect of the hyperreal” (p. 32).  
Observing this collapse, Toffoletti (2007) draws from Donna Haraway, since the 
boundaries between nature and culture are, for Haraway, artificial in the sense that we 
have conceptually separated human and non-human ‘things’, but this separation denies 
the relational connectedness between the human and non-human, whether the latter are 
animals or objects. While posthumanism denotes the recognition that the species line that 
draws and makes meaningful an ordered distinction between the human and non-human 
is artificial, with some posthumanisms focusing more on the politics of animals (human 
or not), this discussion joins others that focus on what is sometimes called a 
technopolitics that emphasize that human capacities and experiences are intertwined with 
technologies to such an extent that they are no longer separable (that is, if they were ever 
separable). In this sense, the real and the virtual have imploded, they no longer exist at all 
as separate, and the simulation acts as a deterrent to this realization. Toffoletti brings light 
to this argument through the example of the Human Genome Project, in which our 
biological essence is coded and made virtual (p. 146). The risk of making our biological 
essence coded lends itself, for example, to legitimating racialized categories and 
assumptions through “pre-determined” genetic dispositions that appear to be more real 
than real and leave cultural and societal influence out of the conversation, even though 
the genome is saturated with unacknowledged cultural and social assumptions. This is 
third order simulation in its most intractable form.  
But, Toffoletti (2007) argues that this implosion, this blurring of boundaries and 
collapse of demarcation that Baudrillard announces with alarm, can offer a point of 
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resistance in the sense that, if the self or subjectivity is indefinable or in flux, then it may 
be re-appropriated for a feminist political project that extends beyond liberal humanist 
limits that operate upon exclusions premised upon a normative definition of the human. It 
allows movement past traditional identity politics, which invoked new normative limits 
onto subjects, into a space in which one may redefine or re-signify what it means to be 
human now, in the age of the hyperreal, as posthuman.  
The arrival of the posthuman (as an acknowledged ontology rather than a new 
entity) is significant to the treatment of human-doll relationships in the discussion that 
follows because the post in posthuman does not refer to what comes after the human, 
such as some kind of human-machine hybrid (this would be a different argument that 
would still grasp onto the respective inherent assumptions of each separate category).  
Neither does the post in posthuman refer here to technologies that progressively 
approximate the human, such as artificial intelligence. Rather, the post refers more to an 
ontological re-consideration of both so-called human and non-human things and a 
recognition of their relationality, but not to the kind of dialectic relationship between 
humans and technologies that transhumanism posits by celebrating the ways in which 
human lives and capacities can be enhanced by technologies. Similarly, the surrogacy 
thesis that forwards the beneficial socialization effects of digital communications or even 
of love dolls remain attached to liberal humanist assumptions that characterize subjects as 
discreet individuals empowered to use what exists in the world (also characterized as 
strict and discreet entities) as instrumental to their agency. Although those who draw 
upon the surrogacy thesis attempt to block attributions of deviance to subjects whose 
social reliance on technologies appears non-normative, they unwittingly reinforce the 
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norms that are associated with liberal humanist understandings of what is human: what is 
becomes closely tied to what ought to be.  
While this notion of the posthuman, at which we arrived through the critiques of 
waning reality provided by critical theory, situates assumptions that inform the present 
work, it does not free this discussion from humanist considerations. The next chapter will 
trace the tensions that accompany the presence of human connections with sociable 
robots with a particular emphasis on the debate between Sherry Turkle and David Levy 
before elaborating on the concept of interanimation for human-doll relationships to 
overcome the emphasis on authenticity and individuality that pervades the Turkle-Levy 
debate. This theoretical discussion will prepare the way for an analysis of an 
advertisement for the Real Love Doll Ange by Kanajo Toys and selected Real Doll 
testimonials. 
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Chapter 2: Can we connect? 
	  
Figure	  2:	  Lars	  and	  the	  Real	  Girl	  
By tracing through each of the theoretical frames addressed in the last chapter, it became 
clear that they focus upon similar concerns. I showed how they not only implicitly 
interrogated the relationship between humans and technologies but they forged a path 
towards a posthumanist critique. Here, I would like to reframe these observations to point 
out how these theoretical contributions circled around the problem of authenticity. As our 
industrial age accelerates, and the proliferation of the technological era reaches heights 
unmatched in the history of human civilization, we are forced to renegotiate what it is 
that we believe identity truly encompasses. The culture industry demonstrates that our 
belief in an agentic-being is distorted and in fact manufactured by consent that is not our 
own. Pseudo-individuality is enacted through inauthentic provisions to articulate a false 
autonomous existence that positions us within a fog of false-consciousness. These 
provisions are so interchangeable that authentic meaning is put at stake; originality is no 
longer viable as life becomes indistinguishable from film (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1993, 
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p. 34). The culture industry melds well with the spectacle as we attempt to recreate the 
superficial and grandiose ideas of mass culture, to attain a lifestyle that has stepped away 
from us but is perceived to be within our grasp. These arguments fall in line with the 
comparison between mass media and mass-culture; are we a reflection of our media 
industry, or do we produce it? The concepts of the culture industry and the spectacle posit 
that we exist in futility, the ultimate consumer striving to replicate a myth that has never 
existed. 
For Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) there no longer is a mirroring effect between the 
spectacle and society, they have imploded. The idea of distance between the two entities 
no longer exists and we are left with only simulation: hyperreality. For Debord, our 
endeavor to live a spectacularized existence has led to somewhat of an ontological shift, a 
complete change in our perception of needs. This ‘mode’ of existence has existed for so 
long and has accelerated to a point in which we are the spectacle for Baudrillard; there no 
longer is a point of origin before it. What we consider our reality is in fact the “desert of 
the real”, (p. 1) a carcass of empty and fractured meaning. Toffoletti (2007) utilizes this 
idea in arguing that this era of simulation is the inception of the posthuman. It is a 
question of what it means to exist today by redefining and re-signifying commonly held 
notions of identity. Even though it is often the case that many disagree with Baudrillard 
because he does not speak to (or maybe even disavows) the bodily existence in his 
writing, Toffoletti suggests that this might be to our benefit. While Baudrillard argues 
that the ‘nature’ of meaning is a carcass, Toffoletti views this an opportunity that 
provides us the necessities to re-appropriate meaning, to culture jam normalization for the 
purposes of her specific political feminist project.  
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What then does it mean to exist in our current ‘condition’, how do we traverse our 
specific cultural, social, historical, and spatial experiences? Descartes’ example is part of 
the rationale behind his doll Francine where he explores his “fascination with artificial 
life and the question of what it actually is to be human” (emphasis added as cited in 
Ferguson, 2010 p. 17). In part trying to respond to that question requires us to address 
how we conceptualize identity. The importance in this process is the shaping of our 
identity through (symbolic) interaction, through reciprocity and alterity. As a theme, I 
think the idea of identity protrudes from the introductory vignettes. Many may argue that 
the dolls represent the capacity to produce love and relationships as commodities to be 
packaged and sold. In this way, they (the dolls) are reduced to the simple monetary 
exchange of their purchase, their status is perceived to be bordering on some combination 
of prostitution and commodity fetishism. Inasmuch as I do agree that there is a level of 
manufacture here, I believe that there is far more occurring with these dolls than only 
commodity exchange. Human relationships with dolls may be significant sites of 
reciprocity that mark the emergence of posthuman sociality.  
Relationships, as portrayed in cinema, advertising, and even contemporarily with 
online dating companies, provide an image of ‘proper’ or ‘successful’ relationships. 
Hegemonically, we find true love in motion pictures, perfect matches on dating websites; 
the inevitable spark that ignites passion in all relationships. At the risk of painting these 
notions with too broad of a stroke, this is not to say that these are the only ways in which 
relationships are portrayed, but that they do take up (in my opinion) a large seat in 
popular discourse. Thus, we turn our focus to the love doll. For those who are 
‘unsuccessful’ with the traditional mode of courting, or have decidedly considered the 
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love doll as a solution, they still enact these hegemonic ideals with the doll. They perform 
their relationships, and I dare say chivalry is not dead. It would seem as though the 
enactment of providing and care-taking that occurs between the love doll and their 
partners not only represent these relationally hegemonic ideals, but are also fulfilling for 
the partners themselves. They find joy and happiness (self-reportedly) within these 
actions. So, inasmuch as one may be able to say that the love doll is only a 
commodification of love or sex, I believe that, even though a purchasable item, the doll is 
discursively so much more. The doll represents and re-represents many of our existing 
social norms and mores, which are culturally and historically relevant to our time. What 
comes to the fore in discussing the love doll is less about the economics and more about 
the social relevance, which is not to discount the monetary value of the doll but to center 
the discussion surrounding the performance and play of identity and relationships.  
Although dolls do not have the most impressive capacity to interact with their 
partners, I do believe that there must be a conversation about those possibilities as they 
are becoming more likely to materialize than not. Two specific books focus in on the 
central tensions that must be considered as we navigate the separation between 
Descartes’ metaphysical fascination: David Levy’s (2007) Love + Sex with Robots: The 
Evolution of Robot-Human Relationships and Sherry Turkle’s (2011) Alone Together: 
Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. Both authors are quite 
well versed in the topic of human-robotic relations and their implications, given the 
current production of robotics that can replicate human behavior. However, these authors 
differ greatly when it comes to the level of acceptance they believe we should be willing 
to offer to human-robotic relations. Levy believes that the robotic-human relations are not 
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to be feared per se and that in essence they are inevitable. He suggests that by 2050 (p. 
303) human-robotic relationships will be just as frequent and accepted as same-sex 
marriage is today4 and to oppose them would be a step backwards. In contrast, Turkle 
suggests that there will be something lost from our inherent humanity if we take this step 
forward uncritically.  
“Love and Sex with Robots”  
Levy (2007) begins by identifying the legacy of research on psychological 
attachment to objects, pets, and parent-like figures. His elaboration of this research is a 
part of his strategic suggestion that attachment, whether to beings or to things, leads to 
affection and love, and if we are able to accomplish the range of attachments that he has 
exemplified then the question of human-robotic relations should be relatively no 
different, it simply proposes or observes the norms of a new age. In both his first and fifth 
chapter, “Falling In Love (With People)” and “Why Do People Fall In Love (With 
People)?”, he suggests that we have or are going to reach a point where we must 
demarcate and define new forms of relationships. As a consequence Levy argues that the 
paradigm of falling in love with people will drastically shift, and that the discourse of 
love will soon inherit and negotiate the possibility of human-robot love.  
In analyzing online dating, Levy (2007) innovatively constructs the process of 
falling in love and why this relatively recent phenomenon prepares us and foreshadows a 
future in which people will fall in love with robots. Levy extends his meta-analysis of 
psychological attachment to support his thesis that this extension of attachment will 
include robots, and he argues that such an extension is pragmatic: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is not to suggest that the need for gay-rights movements is over, or that equality 
has been reached (in my opinion), but that the discussion does exist in a more open field.  
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So why should anyone be surprised if and when people form similarly strong 
attachments to virtual people, to robot people? … There are many reasons, 
including the novelty and the excitement of the experience, the wish to have a 
willing lover available whenever desired, a possible replacement for a lost mate—
a partner who dumped us. (p. 105) 
 
The suggestion here is to posit that the idea of having an artificial partner is healthy and 
possibly provides a positive way of reconciling with loss. It is therapeutic to be able to 
find loving affection and attachment in this way, because we were unable to either attain 
or maintain those relations in the real. For Levy, physical presence should not be 
considered a prerequisite for love. With respect to online dating, Levy suggests that we 
are still capable of falling in love without the presence of that other: 
One conclusion that can safely be drawn from the phenomenon of falling in love 
via the internet … is that it is not a prerequisite for falling in love ever to be in the 
presence of the object of one’s love. The falling-in-love process can be conducted 
in the physical absence of the loved one. (p. 130-131) 
 
Much like pen pals, prior to the advent of our networking technologies, we are able to 
bond with others even at great distances (p. 130). What I find interesting is this notion of 
falling-in-love with a representation of a person; is it the idea of the person that we fall 
for, or the person themselves, or is this yet another false-dichotomy? 
Separated into two sections, Part I outlines the Ten Causes of Falling in Love (p. 
40), which he utilizes in justifying the idea that falling in love with a robot is not as 
farfetched as many believe: 
The logical conclusions, therefore, is that unless one has prejudice against robots, 
and unless one fears social embarrassment as a result of choosing a robot partner, 
the concept that humans will fall in love with robots is a perfectly reasonable one 
to entertain. (p. 150) 
 
The ten causes (similarity, desirable characteristics of the other, reciprocal thinking, 
social influences, filling needs, arousal/unusualness, specific cues, readiness for entering 
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a relationship, being alone, mystery) are for Levy of no real concern in artificially 
recreating them. The ‘criteria’ for falling in love have, it seems, been identified for a long 
time, and we are now able to recreate them for the purposes of our personal betterment. 
ELIZA is an example of this. The computer program, with no form of memory, was a 
type-based program where individuals would be able to type what they were feeling into 
a computer, and ELIZA would respond. The program itself was not truly able to 
comprehend the statements, but would respond with something to the effect of “how does 
this make you feel?” The most interesting outcome of this program was that individuals 
who used ELIZA ended up preferring to talk to her (p. 112), rather than to an actual 
individual about their problems.  
In a 2004 Harvard Magazine issue, Harbour Fraser Hodder published an essay 
entitled “The Future of Marriage” in which he raises demographic, political, and 
economical changes that have influenced the changing properties that marriage 
constitutes (Levy, 2007, p. 153). It is the metamorphosis, the shifting, that Levy wants to 
illuminate. He suggests that just as our acceptance and cultural change towards same-sex 
marriage has changed, so too will the notion of marriage to robots once we are able to 
build them at such a sophisticated level. Alongside these shifting tides is the accelerated 
rates at which they change, and for Levy these shifts are steadily rising (p. 155).  
In part II Levy (2007) pushes forward with the utmost confidence that his 
expectations will indeed materialize by the coming mid-century (p. 181) stating, “…I 
hope at least to dispel any suggestions of outlandishness and to present what I believe are 
compelling arguments to show that sex with robots will become the norm rather than 
being an oddity” (p. 182). Through Sigmund Freud’s notion of transference, he argues 
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that the capacity to become attracted and seduced by computers is a reality that we must 
seriously consider. Transference suggests that the models of understanding we used 
during the early years of our life-course “affects our choices, experiences, and 
relationships into adulthood” (p. 190). Through transference, we may in fact 
subconsciously treat computers as similar models like friends or family, and it is through 
that connection that Levy truthfully believes that we have the capacity to find computers 
(and subsequently robots) as desirable sexual objects (p. 192).  
Although there are crucial points of contestation regarding Levy’s overall 
argument, which will be discussed subsequently, he does provide an important 
perspective for social consideration as advanced technology becomes evermore 
pervasive. Even though there are those who are wary of technology’s ultimate function, 
the results from interacting with the program ELIZA do give an indication of where we 
may be headed in terms of what will constitute satisfactory, or even preferred, social 
partners in the future. Given this, and the coinciding advancements of the sex doll 
industry, what will happen if the two separate entities of artificial mind and body fuse? 
This is a question we most certainly will discuss later.  
In 2003, Levy comments on the success of the company Orient Industry Dolls’ 
which was reported in the Mainichi Daily News, a Japanese news outlet (p. 248). 
Tsuchiya, president of the company, comments that during the formative years of their 
production, they received customers who had gained permission from their wives, 
mothers with children dealing with some form of disability, and generally anyone who 
had problems related to their sex life (as cited in p. 249). As the success of the company 
grew, customers’ attitudes towards the dolls changed, resulting in the consideration that 
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the doll is more than a simple sex object or means to an end to “objects of deep affection” 
(as cited in p. 249). As Tsuchiya notes in an interview that appeared in the 2004 edition 
of the Asian Sex Gazette, “She can be an irreplaceable lover, who provides a sense of 
emotional healing” (as cited in p. 249). To add more complexity to this, there are 
Buddhist memorial services held for discarded dolls in Ueno Park (as cited in p. 250). We 
are already seeing a real, tangible effort on behalf of dolls’ partners to treat them with the 
same respect we treat our ‘real’ friends and family. In this instance the doll does not 
embody a mere sexual nature, it truly provides its partner with a fulfilling relational 
value. The relationship that the doll’s partner fosters has real affects.  
Levy leaves us with two departing points that should be addressed, the first being 
an expectation he holds that will materialize by the year 2050: 
Imagine a world in which robots are just like us (almost). A world in which the 
boundary between our perceptions of robots and our perceptions of our fellow 
humans has become so blurred that most of us treat robots as though they are 
mental, social, and moral beings. A world in which the general perception of 
robot creatures is raised to the level of our perception of biological creatures. 
When this happens, when robot creatures are generally perceived as being similar 
to biological creatures, the effect on society will be enormous. (p. 303) 
 
The debate on roboethics has up to now been very focused on issues that we 
regard as the unethical use of robots. But what about the unethical treatment of 
robots? Should we not in this debate be speaking on behalf of the robots of the 
future? I believe we should. (p. 305)  
 
The imagery that comes to mind in Levy’s expectation towards our future relationships 
represents something akin to science fiction. Levy depicts a futuristic world with robots 
that are borderline unidentifiable and that the artificial will be more real than the real, to 
borrow from Baudrillard. What I think becomes quite interesting is the conversation 
behind the “as though” or “as if” they were human. 
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In referencing the notion of roboethics, the story of a mutilated RealDoll 
embodies part of the fear that Levy mentions. Ferguson (2010) mentions a case reported 
by Fiero, the RealDoll doctor who describes violence and vivid imagery of one specific 
doll owner, 
…an Asian undergraduate student at a university in California dropped his 1-year-
old doll off for repairs…. ‘I was offended in so many ways…[h]e put her feet 
behind her head and reamed that doll with whatever cock he’s got. He fucked her 
violently. She was achieving positions she shouldn’t achieve or be forced to try. 
Her vagina and anus were a giant gaping hole.’ … Fiero says he’ll never again 
make repairs for the student, who he now refers to as JTR – Jack the Ripper. (p. 
128-129) 
 
The fear of misuse depicted here represents that of a violent sex crime, but the question 
remains: isn’t it just a doll? The disgust mentioned by Fiero somewhat uses the notion of 
“as though” or “as if”; the violent sex crime is only represented as if the doll were a real 
person. But, Levy has entered into the paradigm shift in which the artificial and the real, 
or the simulation and the real are intimately intertwined. The abuse the doll endures 
provokes emotional repulsion, and this points to a change in the way we perceive such 
acts, or such ‘realities’.  
“Alone Together”  
Sherry Turkle’s (2011) argument over the matter of robotics suggests a far more 
cautionary tale than Levy’s arms-wide-open approach. She comments, “Love and Sex 
seems to celebrate an emotional dumbing down, a willful turning away from the 
complexities of human partnerships—the inauthentic as a new aesthetic” (p. 6). Her 
book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less From Each 
Other, is a poignant explanation of why we should not be so accepting of the notion of 
finding solace and comfort in robotics and technology writ large. In Turkle’s opening 
 	  42	  
introduction, she refers to an earlier statement in which she describes computers as a 
second self, or “a mirror of the mind. Now the metaphor no longer goes far enough” 
(p.16).  
In an interesting experiment, she provided children (ages 5-8) with Furbies to see 
their reaction. Furby, a late 1990 children’s toy, was a fuzzy animal like robot that was 
able to ‘learn’, and responded to interaction with humans. It would progress and learn 
words, blink, sneeze, and cry if neglected. As a separate part to Turkle’s inquiry, she 
allowed several students to take the Furby home with them for an extended period, 
approximately two weeks. She did not expect how strong of an attachment to the Furbies 
the children would have. One of the participants, Zach, received a malfunctioning Furby 
that left him distraught. Zach had been studying Hebrew, and recently the Furby had 
‘learned’ how to say Dayeinu and was saying it in its sleep. For Zach, it seemed that the 
relationship between them was in fact real; how else would it have learned this Hebrew 
word? Unfortunately, the Furby had begun making strange noises that left him severely 
concerned. Turkle responded to his parents’ plea to replace it, but unfortunately Zach had 
become to attached to his Furby, the Furby he nurtured, taught, and with whom he shared 
experience. For the children who played with Furby, Turkle found that, even though they 
knew it was a robot, they understood that it was “alive enough to die” (p. 43).  
Although these research subjects are children, Turkle (2011) is finding that the 
level of their attachment to the sociable robot takes on a far more intense affect than it 
does with a static object like a doll or stuffed animal. For Turkle, this is a turning point:  
We are at the point of seeing digital objects as both creatures and machines. A 
series of fractured surfaces – pet, voice, machine, friend – come together to create 
an experience in which knowing that a Furby is a machine does not alter the 
feeling that you can cause it pain.” (p. 46) 
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It seems that the digital object has been given an existential existence; the Furby can be 
hurt and killed. The sociability of the Furby, in this case, leads into a higher plane in 
which they are in fact alive enough. As with many childhood toys and objects, they 
embody that of a confidant, someone to tell your secrets, hopes, and dreams to, but in this 
instance the Furby responds.  
We are moving in a direction where technology no longer represents the 
simplicity and one-directionality of a tool; it has evolved to a much greater extent. Social 
robots and computer technologies are changing the social landscape, and consequently 
we are changing with it. Turkle (2011) notes in her chapter “Alive Enough” two 
conversations she had, separated by twenty years. In 1983, she spoke to a boy named 
Bruce about the idea of a robotic or computerized confidant. Due to the limitations that 
human relations offer, we are not infallible, we are not perfect, and for Bruce these are 
“the ties that bind” (p. 50). Imperfection is the undertow of real connection. Turkle’s 
second conversation in 2003 goes very differently. For Howard, a fifteen-year-old boy, 
the idea of a robotic confidant would be a blessing since he thinks it is more difficult for 
his father to help him with high school problems than it would be for a robot. In 
comparison, the limitation of life experience and understanding that people have are in 
fact a detriment for Howard. A robot could be uploaded with a database of experiences 
and circumstances rather than a single life-course, and thus would be able to give you the 
‘right’ answer (p. 51). This idea provides Howard with far more confidence and 
reassurance if a robot rather than a person guided him because it would be “advice you 
could be sure of” (p. 51). Turkle concludes that “[f]rom Bruce to Howard, human 
fallibility has gone from being an endearment to a liability” (p. 51). 
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This shift in confidence towards robotics over people raises some stark questions. 
Embodiment and experience are superseded by programmed databases in this instance; 
will that knowledge be considered infallible? How can one simply assume the ‘right’ 
answer to be ‘true’?; what would we consider agency to be if our consultants are robots? 
These are questions that probably troubled Howard when he asked his father about how 
he should go about pursuing a crush he had at school even though she was seeing 
someone. His father suggested he ask her out anyways basing his advice on his previous 
experience, something Howard disregarded. He argued that “[r]obots can be made to 
understand things like jealousy from observing how people behave….A robot can be 
fully understanding and open-minded”, where as humans are hazardous robots are “safe” 
(p. 51).  
This notion of safe versus risk is well embodied in the following excerpt in 
Turkle’s (2011) third chapter, “True Companions”: 
I return to the question of harm. Dependence on a robot presents itself as risk free. 
But when one becomes accustomed to “companionship” without demands, life 
with people may seem overwhelming. Dependence on a person is risky—it makes 
us subject to rejection—but it also opens us to deeply knowing another. Robotic 
companionship may seem a sweet deal, but it consigns us to a closed world—the 
lovable as safe and made to measure. (p. 66) 
 
We can return to Turkle’s previously cited “inauthentic as a new aesthetic” (p. 4), a 
process in which our intimate dulling is celebrated as achievement as we romanticize the 
melancholic. Here, we are identifying the darker side of maintaining a relationship with 
the artificial. For Turkle, artificial intelligence is just that: artificial, and because of that 
characteristic she finds no solace in the notion of reciprocity with a machine even if we 
begin to lose site of such distinctions – we are blurring them.  
 	  45	  
Turkle (2011) tells a story of visiting Japan in the early 1990s where the 
demographic shift is that of a booming elderly population (p. 74). “Unlike in previous 
generations, children were mobile, and women were in the workforce” (p. 74), making 
visiting and socializing with the older generation harder. As a result, many began hiring 
actors to visit with their parents: 
Most fascinating were reports about the parents who knew that they were being 
visited by actors. They took the actors’ visits as a sign of respect, enjoyed the 
company, and played the game…But when I heard of it, I thought, “If you are 
willing to send in an actor, why not send in a robot?” (p. 74) 
 
Mentioned earlier in this section, Levy (2007) speaks about the program ELIZA and how 
people enjoyed and some preferred speaking to her rather than to a real person. Turkle 
has coined the term the “ELIZA effect” to refer to the notion that we are complicit in the 
fantasy that provides us solace in speaking to a machine, who Turkle argues cannot truly 
comprehend human emotion (p. 24). Here Turkle expresses the ‘as if’ sentiment, “They 
spoke as if someone were listening but knew they were their own audience” (emphasis 
added, p. 24). I believe this echoes the subtitle of the book, Why we expect more from 
technology and less from each other, in the sense that we are able to make ourselves feel 
better through the ELIZA effect by allowing ourselves to believe that the program truly 
cares.  
As the elderly demographic balloons, it is becoming the largest demographic in 
Japan, and North America is heading in a similar direction, it has been suggested that 
caring for the elderly will inevitably become too overwhelming (Turkle, 2011, p. 106). 
For some, the solution is to turn to robotics as an aid, a manufactured technology of 
elderly care. Of this, Turkle notes, “[w]e ask technology to perform what used to be 
“love’s labour”: taking care of each other” (p. 107). This is a marked shift for Turkle, for 
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we speak of care, but, in this reductive sense, it is merely “care enough” (p. 107). By 
assuming that robotics can meet the demands of care, the meaning of caring changes. 
Turkle reconsiders the phenomenon, practiced in Japan, of sending actors to visit their 
parents; she notes that it is the performance that provides solace and not the inherent 
interaction. She sums up this point eloquently in the following two excerpts, in almost a 
romantic ideal, 
A sociable robot is sent in to do a job—it could be doing crosswords or regulating 
food intake—and once it’s there, people attach. Things happen that elude 
measurement. You begin with an idea about curing difficulties with dieting. But 
then the robot and person go to a place where the robot is imagined as a cure of 
souls. (p. 115-116) 
 
The questions for the future are not whether children will love their robot 
companions more than their pets or even their parents. The questions are rather, 
What will love be? And what will it mean to achieve ever-greater intimacy with 
our machines? Are we ready to see ourselves in the mirror of the machine and to 
see love as our performances of love? (p. 138) 
 
It is this last quandary on love that is at the heart of this polemic between Levy and 
Turkle. For her the robot cannot love, it can only pretend to love. In this sense it is the 
shift in which pretending becomes real, to pretend to love is to love and it is the diluting 
of human emotion and the meeting of such needs that haunts Turkle. She suggests that 
the pretend is increasingly the model for the authentic. The ELIZA effect is for Turkle 
one of the greatest cheats we produce in ourselves; it is our investment in an object 
programmed to appear social but cannot invest back in us that provides us with a false 
sense of reciprocity. But this argument I might suggest represents a romantic melancholy 
with our technology; as I will address later, faith in the other’s reciprocal emotion is not 
particular to sociable technologies. 
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In part II of Alone Together, Turkle (2011) investigates network connectivity and 
how we are digitally socialized. This is where we can begin to interrogate how we 
construct and represent our identities in a virtual space. She notes: 
When part of your life is lived in virtual places a vexed relationship develops 
between what is true and what is “true here,” true in simulation…on social-
networking sites such as Facebook, we think we will be presenting ourselves, but 
our profile ends up as somebody else—often the fantasy of who we want to be. 
Distinctions blur. (p. 153) 
 
For me, Turkle’s observation seems reminiscent of the arguments about identity that 
Debord, on the one hand, and Horkheimer and Adorno, on the other hand, make with 
their concepts of the spectacle and the culture industry, respectively. Facebook provides 
us with pseudo celebrity and friendship that supply evidence of our online popularity that 
ironically leaves us feeling empty and alone – bringing another meaning to ‘alone in a 
crowded (chat)room.’ I will note, however, that inasmuch as this pseudo-individuality 
seems to be a large part of Facebook, I suggest involvement on Facebook does exist 
spectrally. It is not necessarily always the case that everyone has invested equally into the 
construction of their profiles (funnily enough, I just changed mine). But Turkle does sum 
this idea up by suggesting that “[w]hen ever we have time to write, edit, and delete, there 
is room for performance. The ‘real me’ turns out to be elusive” (p. 180). I think that the 
movie Easy A (2010) illustrates this well, maybe too bluntly, by looking at how social 
media sites such as Facebook have created a pre-meditated archive of our performances: 
“I don’t know what your generation’s fascination is with documenting your every 
thought, but I can assure you they are not all diamonds … who gives a rats ass?” 
With our increasing and proliferating use of social media to stay connected, to 
remain as “always on” (Turkle, 2011), we are in the process of diluting our relationships 
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and how we interact. One of the major changes, at least with younger generations, is that 
certain ways of speaking to one another and the kind of message to be conveyed is 
required to ‘fit’ the medium (Turkle, 2011, p. 199). For instance, newer expectations 
produced by changing media suggest that, to be justified, a phone call requires somewhat 
more of a need to talk about something serious, and that is all the call is used for now. 
Turkle spoke to Hugh, a twenty-five year old, about the different social demands that are 
present in phone calls versus communications in IMs or Facebook. He finds that people 
who agree to phone calls have the expectation and demand of undivided attention to that 
person, noting: 
They’re disappointed if I’m, like, not talking about being depressed, about 
contemplating a divorce, about being fired…You ask for private cell time, you 
better come up with the goods. (p. 204) 
 
I agree that the phone call has changed in this sense, which is not to say that this is the 
only use of the phone call now but it is generally assumed to be a more urgent mode of 
communication.  
What has also become a popular mode of anonymous, but intimate, conversation 
occurs on a website entitled PostSecret that receives postcards and puts them up for 
others to see. It is a completely anonymous website, but the confessionals can often be 
quite emotionally intense. For Turkle (2011), she observes that many of the posts present 
simply quick, off hand remarks, but there are posters who pause to “take stock” (p. 230) 
as they make vulnerable contributions. I visited the website recently, since I am 
unfamiliar with this form of posting online, one of them caught my eye: 
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Figure	  3:	  Postsecret	  
5Text: My big strong macho husband is gay he thinks nobody knows…but I do. I hate 
him for what he’s done to me and our family 	  
In her chapter, “True Confessions”, Turkle finds that although the process of 
expressing one’s self anonymously and to an anonymous audience might seem 
therapeutic, she does raise concern about the reduction in emotion this leads to: 
Confessing to a website and talking to a robot deemed “therapeutic” both 
emphasize getting something “out.” Each act makes the same claim: bad feelings 
become less toxic when released. Each takes as its premise the notion that you can 
deal with feelings without dealing directly with a person. In each, something that 
is less than conversation begins to seem like a conversation. (p. 231) 
 
I think that it is here that we begin to see the full magnitude of our reliance on emotional 
mediums and how they are regimenting our affect by diluting and reducing the actual 
effects. We might hone in on Turkle’s title, which asks why we ask more of technology 
and less of each other; while our claim to always be connected, tethered, always on marks 
our new age of connectedness, I think the question now really embodies McLuhan’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Retrieved January 21, 2014 from postsecret.com 
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notion of the medium is the message. And here we are finding that we are more 
connected through one medium over the other, which is we utilize more mediated 
technologies and less face-to-face interaction. We are slowly training ourselves to 
respond and express ourselves in an ‘unreal’ fashion, where pre-meditation and 
simulation are becoming the norm, where performance is performance enough (p. 282).  
From our social tendencies and attachments as children, to the digitalized lived 
experiences of our adolescents and young adulthood, to the reshaping of how we think 
about elderly care – although the implementations of robotics in each generation are not 
ubiquitous – the notions that such change carries have leaked into the ether of popular 
discourse. They may not be as farfetched as we might have believed ten, or even five 
years ago. What is of significance in this comparison is that both Levy and Turkle are 
aware of not only how much of our communications are mediated by new technologies 
but how we are increasingly having more direct relationships with our technologies. Both 
authors have valuable insight into the progress and can speculate into the future about 
how we will utilize technologies such as ELIZA, and how that may impact our current 
understandings of authentic affection. We are used to seeing such questions addressed in 
movies and fiction, instances where vulnerabilities are similar across race, gender, age, 
location, and the ultimate search for ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’. But finding such things is 
quickly changing, they are amorphous, and Turkle (2011) is concerned that normalizing 
the reduction of our interactions is a risk, and that it may in fact become something we 
desire (p. 295). In my mind Turkle best sums the polemic that we have arrived at with her 
concept of the “robotic moment” (p. 295): 
We animate robotic creatures by projecting meaning onto them and are thus 
tempted to speak of their emotions and even their “authenticity.” We can do this if 
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we focus on the feelings the robots evoke in us. But too often the unasked 
question is, What does the robot feel? We know what the robot cannot feel: it 
cannot feel human empathy or the flow of human connection. Indeed the robot 
can feel nothing at all. Do we care? Or does the performance of feeling now 
suffice? (p. 282) 
 
I think that the conversation is difficult regardless of which ‘side’ you are on, whether or 
not that is Turkle’s or Levy’s, we have a hard time understanding how emotionally 
vulnerable we can be. So the move towards robotics and artificial intelligence to 
anonymous confessionals and to our digital avatars online truly questions the notions of 
how we interact through mediation, or whether mediation is all we have, if it is enough 
now, or if that is (or has been) simply our condition. I think that in our current cultural 
and spatial period, marked by post-industrial, immaterial conditions, we are on the 
horizon of a profound breach of self-understanding that might allow us to move beyond 
the question of mediation. We may not have passed into this horizon completely, but our 
current predicament does make one speculate, “one wonders” (Turkle, 2011, p. 147). 
Interanimate things rather than inanimate objects 
Social theorists who focus on consumer culture, like Adorno and Horkheimer (1993) and 
Debord (1983), have argued that our consumption of commodities has resulted in an 
erosion of our culture. Through their interpretation, the obsession over commodities is a 
result of manipulating privation and consumer needs, where the commodity’s promise is 
a cheat, and we are therefore always left wanting more. This cycle of consumerism, as 
noted earlier, argues that the need for consumption is manufactured yet shielded by a 
false sense of agency. We buy because we are led to believe it will provide us with a 
sense of individuality, however this belief is a false consciousness. What follows is less a 
criticism of the commodity, and more of an investigation in the relationship that we 
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produce with things. It requires that we look beyond the negative connotations that are 
associated with commodification, and considers how we are positioned in relation to 
things. It should be noted that what follows does not attempt to offer a redemption of the 
commodity or a rejection of commodity critiques. First, a discussion of Daniel Miller’s 
(2010) work will offer insight into the idea that we are all “stuff” and that the dichotomy 
between “stuff” and us is necessarily false. Second, consideration of Ben Highmore’s 
(2011) interpretation of the relationship between humans and “things” will disrupt the 
assumption that it is one-directional by showing how “things” have historically operated 
on behalf of humans. Taking these respective arguments as a point of departure, I will 
build upon this with Keith Basso’s (1996) concept of interanimation, which is originally 
focused upon a “sense of place” (p. 54), but I will extend it to objects and consequently, 
to the doll.  
Stuff 
 Daniel Miller (2010) pushes against the common notion that mass consumption is 
inherently superficial. Miller points out that quite often we generalize about a consumer 
society: “Becoming a consumer society is generally seen as symptomatic of a loss of 
depth in the world” (p. 22). However, material consumption, he claims, is not a specific 
trait of Western civilization and it can be found in every culture and society (p. 4). For 
Miller, purchasing commodities and being materialistic is not a symptom of vanity but 
involves an important meaning making process that should not be considered denigrating. 
This is to say that a major insight for Miller is not to claim that his work is a recovery of 
commodity since that would assume both an erosion and recovery therein. Rather, it is a 
revision on materialism that informs his perspective on studying humanity: “that the best 
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way to understand, convey and appreciate our humanity is through attention to our 
fundamental materiality” (p. 4).  
 Part of this premise rests on our conception of how we inform identity 
construction. His point is that the argument of material culture as superficial makes the 
assumption that there is a difference between who we are, which is located within us, and 
the outward representation (superficial) of that interior (Miller, 2010, p. 16). This posits 
that the authentic self is not material and that everything else is a failed attempt to 
represent that inner quality. Miller elaborates on why this seems mistaken:  
The assumption is that being – what we truly are – is located deep inside 
ourselves and is in direct opposition to the surface. A clothes shopper is shallow 
because a philosopher or a saint is deep…But these are all metaphors. Deep inside 
ourselves is blood and bile, not philosophical certainty. My point is that there is 
simply no reason on earth as to why another population should see things this 
same way. No reason at all why they should consider our real being to be deep 
inside a falsity on the outside. (p. 16-17) 
 
This argument suggests that every culture is materialistic, not just the ‘first’ or ‘western’ 
world. That being the case, Miller’s proposition asserts that we measure others based on 
labour, not on birth (p. 21). In this sense ‘who we are’ is based on how we decide to 
construct ourselves, through that labour, and it is that work that should be measured. 
Miller wants to subvert the notion of representation, the idea that we have objects that 
represent us by imparting the idea that those things actually constitute and help determine 
us (p. 40). The argument lends itself to the larger premise that Miller (2010) asserts: “that 
things make people just as much as people make things” (p. 135). Therefore, the 
dichotomy between things and us is necessarily false, and that “we too are stuff” (p. 6). 
The caveat being that stuff can be used to either enhance or submerge us (p. 6), and as a 
result there is nothing inherently pernicious about material culture.  
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Things 
 Ben Highmore (2011) aids in providing what Miller (2010) would call an analysis 
of ‘stuff’ through his work Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday. Highmore 
contributes to this discussion with a formulation about how he distinguishes ‘objects’ 
versus ‘things.’ Highmore illuminates sociology’s oversight of the social lives of things 
through Bruno Latour’s (1992) essay “Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of 
a Few Mundane Artifacts” (as cited in p. 69). Latour suggests that sociology must 
endeavor to explain the social theory of objects in the same way that sociology has 
explained humans (p. 227, as cited in p. 69). On this, Highmore finds: 
The argument that sociology fails to understand society because it is blind to the 
presence of non-human objects is premised on the recognition that things are 
social agents too. For Latour social things are actants in the production, 
transformation and reproduction of social worlds. (p. 69) 
 
These “social things”, as Latour suggests, exist in part to take the place of human tasks, 
for the sake of humans not having to do them and thus are inherently anthropomorphic 
for three reasons: 
first, it has been made by humans; second, it substitutes for the actions of people 
and is a delegate that permanently occupies the position of a human; and third, it 
shapes action by prescribing back what sort of people should pass through the 
door. (Latour, p. 235 as cited in p. 70) 
 
Therefore, the object in question becomes an actor on behalf of human activity; it takes 
the place of a human actually doing the action, something Latour terms a ‘groom’ (as 
cited in p. 69). The delegation of things to take on the responsibility of actions previously 
assigned to humans results in a deskilling of that population that ultimately changes our 
inherent “humanness” (p. 70). The change of the ontology of our humanness is altered by 
the existence of things that labour on our behalf. Though, Highmore finds Adorno’s take 
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to be less than favourable, as he suggests this “redistribution of competences is inevitably 
deskilling, forgetting, and unlearning” (p. 71). Although the analysis of things is not 
necessarily to poorly color this transaction between humans and non-humans, it does 
display how integral things are, and how their presence has both affect and effect on us. 
 For Highmore, there is “a mutually constituting interaction between people and 
things” (p. 58). There is a give and take with objects, and a separation of a knowledge of 
history as objects take up more social tasks and interact in daily life. He provides a 
captivating entrance into this suggestion of the lives of things:  
As human beings we attach ourselves to the thingly world: our ordinary lives are 
lived out in the midst of things. We often surround ourselves with keepsakes and 
mementos; we arrange our intimate spaces with furniture, tools and utensils; we 
simultaneously hide and reveal our naked bodies with clothes. For their part 
things turn towards us: they call us, sidle up to us. (p. 58) 
 
Things that have roots as a groom have the possibility of completely replacing the 
existence of that skill in our daily lives; we no longer know how to walk through walls 
without doors as Latour (1992) suggests (as cited in p. 70). I do not think that Highmore 
is trying to abolish the dichotomy between us and things, much like Miller’s (2010) 
approach suggesting that we are all ‘stuff’. But he is providing a platform to establish a 
relationship between things and us, which is to say that the relationship is not one 
directional. As a consequence our ontological grasp shifts with the presence of things 
resulting in a dynamic understanding of how things work.  
 There seems to be two acts occurring in things for Highmore (2011): (1) the 
pragmatics of things that are delegated to human actions, and (2) the historical presence 
that each thing has accrued through its lifespan. I would like to draw attention to this 
second point. Simple objects accrue a personal life history as they gain scars and obvious 
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signs of use that become interlocked with us: “There is nothing exceptional about it. Its 
visceral and mnemonic thing-ness requires a telling that takes time because its thing-ness 
took time to form” (p. 65-66). The intertwining of delegated action and memory pressed 
upon the things then proposes a relationship between humans and non-humans. It makes 
problematic the divorce of life lived outside of “things”, outside of “stuff” (Miller, 2010), 
where in large part we devote so much of our time to their manicuring.  
Interanimate 
 This re-theorization of objects provides a different approach to subjectivities with 
‘things’ (Highmore, 2011). In this the things are not complacent, meaningless, superficial 
stand-ins for a lack of more authentic or inwards representation, they ultimately help 
constitute us (Miller, 2010). In this constitution, the things take on roles and histories of 
their own, and as a consequence develop a rapport and subjectivities of their own. Our 
relationship between the thing and us becomes reciprocal in this sense, which imbues the 
thing or the stuff with (for lack of a better term) agency. Interestingly, the focus of this 
conversation then interrogates the relationship between the heightened agency that liberal 
humanism has granted to us and the increased agency that Miller and Highmore grant to 
things because it highlights the ways in which our subjectivities are intimately co-
produced with ‘things’.  
 One of the interesting aspects of this interrogation of the intertwined relationship 
between humans and things is that people and things are animated interdependently; we 
are just as hailed into action as the thing is. Keith Basso (1996) provides an intriguing 
way of framing this interdependency with respect to subjectivity and place and space. As 
an anthropologist, Basso is interested in the ways that geographical location and the 
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“sense” of that place becomes productive; by recognizing and, thus, producing our 
reflection in a place, meaning is coproduced through both subject and place (p. 54). This 
recognition is something that Basso finds as a gap in the literature, stating: “Missing from 
the discipline is a thematized concern with the ways in which citizens of the earth 
constitute their landscapes and take themselves to be connected to them” (p. 54). For 
Basso, there is a reciprocal relationship that occurs in this “sense of place” (p. 54), which 
he elaborates upon:  
The experience of sensing places, then, is thus both roundly reciprocal and 
incorrigibly dynamic. As places animate the ideas and feelings of persons who 
attend to them, these same ideas and feelings animate the places on which 
attention has been bestowed, and the movements of this process—inward toward 
facets of the self, outward toward aspects of the external world, alternately both 
together—cannot be known in advance. (p. 55) 
 
Here, the interdependency that arises from sense of place and individual evocation of 
feeling are intertwined; the individual requires the place to produce a response that, 
without the place, would not exist. It is this “sense of place” that Basso comes to know as 
a process of “interanimation” (p. 55). To explicate this idea, Basso takes from Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1965),  
When knowledge and feelings are oriented toward something real, actually 
perceived, the thing, like a reflector, returns the light it has received from it. As a 
result of this continual interaction, meaning is continually enriched at the same 
time as the object soaks up affective qualities. The object thus obtains its own 
particular depth and richness. (p. 87-91 as cited in p. 55) 
 
The gaze we receive as well as the gaze we place upon the place then coincide together to 
interdependently result in a meaning making process. Basso provides us with the idea 
that there is a relationship in its own right between place and subject and “[t]hus, through 
a vigorous conflation of attentive subject and geographical object, places come to 
generate their own fields of meaning” (p. 56).   
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 The relevance of this discussion of objects not just being objects but “things” 
(Highmore, 2011) gives us a chance to discuss interanimation (Basso, 1996). The 
implication of interanimation being associated with objects rather than with a “sense of 
place” offers a completely different stance on understanding the relationship between an 
individual’s subjectivity and the relationship created with their doll. The suggestion that 
there indeed exists a reciprocal exchange between an individual and the doll informs the 
argument that their relationship exists in a way that is not necessarily comparable to 
socially privileged, human to human relations, and may open up new theoretical 
possibilities for approaching these emergent posthuman relationships.  
Discourse: A methodological consideration 
Discourse analysis will inform my readings of the iDollator discussion forum and 
testimonials on the Real Doll website. Prior to elaborating on discourse analysis, 
however, it will be illustrative to show what is at stake in the distinction between 
discourse and ideology, since these respective terms may appear similar but they propose 
very different ontological conceptions. Mills (2004) notes that discourse is often 
implicated in a dialogue or rebuttal with definitions of ideology. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, for our purposes it may be useful to see some of the major reasons as to 
why there are differences.6 The notion of ideology is in opposition to or masks the idea of 
some form of ‘truth’, a sense of reality that is hidden from us (p. 28). Ideology acts upon 
us to justify some form of covert alienation or exploitation, a way (at least for Marx) to 
suppress the masses as represented by forms or types of false consciousness. The implicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It should be noted, however, that although I have attempted to separate them through 
concrete differences alongside Mills’ (2004) argument, the distinctions between ideology 
and discourse are far more fluid than alluded to here.	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notion of ideology is that it can be counter-acted or suppressed since the ‘truth’ can be 
retrieved. This also suggests that individuals still retain a sense of agency, or a political 
capacity to change their current perceived reality.  
For Mills (2004) the operation of discourse is something that produces something 
else and in this process there is less of a ‘truth’ being masked. In Foucault’s (1972) “The 
Discourse on Language”, he speaks about a will to truth or a will to knowledge but also 
finds limits within it. Specific historical, spatial, and political contexts allow for certain 
discourses of truth to be considered authentic and thus for certain discourses of truth to be 
considered false: an episteme (Mills, p. 51). The will to truth is an attempt to find 
something constant or to have something defined, explained, or clarified. In relation to 
the specific historical or political state certain truths can be considered as legitimate, thus 
excluding other forms or wills to truth (Foucault, 1972, p. 218). Mills notes that Foucault 
“is aware of the fact that he himself as a subject can only speak within the limits imposed 
upon him by the discursive frameworks circulating at the time” (p. 29). Foucault states, 
A division emerged between Hesiod and Plato, separating true discourse from 
false; it was a new division for, henceforth, true discourse was no longer 
considered precious and desirable, since it had ceased to be discourse linked to 
the exercise of power (1972, p. 218).  
 
This excerpt suggests that legitimate discourses do not necessarily need to be true, but 
linked or formed through power. To change or subvert discourse or types of discourses 
then requires a shift of power, an epistemic break. This epistemic break or shift of what is 
possible to know is not an immediate one, despite the term break denoting a relatively 
instant action. The driving point here is that there is no simplistic way to subvert 
Foucault’s notion of power and discourse in comparison to some forms of ideology. Mills 
surmises this point quite eloquently, 
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Some Marxist theorists have tended to view language as simply a vehicle 
whereby people are forced to believe ideas which are not true or in their interests 
but, within discourse theory, language is the site where those struggles are acted 
out (2004, p. 38).  
 
The use of Foucault’s work on power and discourse is a useful tool to exemplify 
and bring to light a new way of framing current issues surrounding sexism and racism; it 
allows another perspective into the complexities of power that is not simply top down or 
ideological. However, this troubles the issue of agency within Foucault’s complex of 
power, and Mills suggests that it is necessary to modify his work “to account for 
individual subjects’ choice to resist oppression” (2004, p. 38). Since language and 
discourse are the active sites of struggle and domination, this poses a problematic for 
combatting marginalization.  
Dorothy Smith (1993) attempts to address this problem by reinserting women’s 
experiences and the social organizations that are fundamental to the relations of ruling in 
contemporary capitalism (p. 1). Smith addresses the problem of femininity as a form of 
discourse rather than ideology but asserts agency in Foucault’s notion of the confessional. 
For example, a criminal confessing to the crimes that they have committed and supplying 
themselves as criminals constructs them as a criminal through the process of confessing 
(Mills, p. 73). Consequently, a woman talking about their difficulties with feminine 
discourse constructs herself as a compliant individual to femininity (p. 73). By 
reasserting and changing the discourse or scenarios that would perpetuate feminine 
discourse, Smith argues to not act from such a stance so as to break the cycle of feminine 
signifiers.  
Similar arguments have been posed in post-colonial theory, to reinsert the 
marginalized voice back into discourse. Edward Said’s Orientalism can and has been 
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used to frame this issue. The overarching argument that Said makes is that throughout the 
nineteenth century, a large amount of literature was produced about other cultures 
through the lens of colonialism and imperialism (Mills, p. 97). Stuart Hall (2007) 
summarizes Said’s work as an analysis of “the various discourses and institutions which 
constructed and produced, as an object of knowledge, that entity called ‘the Orient’” (p. 
205). Orientalism was a archive of discourses that was bound together by a unifying set 
of values; “[t]hese ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with 
a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere” (Said, 1985, p. 41-42 as cited in Hall, p. 206). 
What this did was produce a common sense knowledge around the Orient, and through 
that process stereotyped large populations leading to what Hall terms ‘The West and the 
Rest’ discourse (p. 206).  
The act of representation, classifying large groups of individuals into rigid 
European knowledge, is a form of stereotyping. This act has produced the Other through 
a discourse of scientific truth. Hall (2007) deconstructs this system, finding that the 
operation of stereotyping has two key features in representing the Other. The first is an 
act of description that homogenizes or collapses complex meanings, streamlining them 
into one simplistic form, like a “cardboard cut-out” (p. 215). This cut-out, an exaggerated 
simplification, is used as a signifier for its subject as its essence (p. 215). The second is a 
splitting of the stereotype into two halves, its good and bad sides creating a dualism (p. 
216). This stereotyping is the fundamental feature of constructing Said’s ‘Other’, as it not 
only marginalizes, but it also constructs the West as the pinnacle of civilization. The 
West defines itself as civilized because it defines the Other as not.  
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Arguments leveled against Said’s Orientalism suggest that he homogenized all 
colonial writings together, and that the assumption of “a continuous history of oppressive 
representational practices” leads to colonial knowledge being “not only what we have but 
all we have” (Porter, 1982, p. 180 as cited in Mills, 2004, p. 106). Post-colonial discourse 
suggests that the ‘truths’ of these cultures are not recoverable and that all we have are 
interpretations of “a set of heterogeneous texts, which had material effects on those 
cultures” (Mills, p. 107). Mills notes two theories that suggest a new way of reading these 
heterogeneous texts: “subaltern” and “the contact zones” (p. 107, 108). 
Gayatri Spivak has argued for the subaltern group theory which posits that the 
interactions of the ‘native’ with colonialists are most likely from the elite group, and thus 
the colonialists’ experience represents but a small glimpse into an otherwise 
heterogeneous group (as cited in Mills, p. 107). This suggests that reading colonialist 
texts as only oppressive paradoxically reinforces the position of the West as oppressive 
and we must therefore concern ourselves with the voices who are most effaced by 
colonialist texts: the subaltern group. Consequently, “[b]y refusing to accept the surface 
of discourse as representing the sum total of statements on a particular situation, it is 
possible to analyze discursive structures as much for what they exclude as for what they 
determine” (Mills, p. 107-108).  
The “contact zone” is a term introduced by Mary Louise Pratt with reference to 
how we imagine cultures interacting with one another. She defines the term as the 
following: 
I use this term to refer to social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple 
with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such 
as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of 
the world today. Eventually I will use the term to reconsider the models of 
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community that many of us rely on in teaching and theorizing and that are under 
challenge today (Pratt, 1991, p. 33).  
 
The concept of the contact zone is a methodological device that provides a suggested way 
of reading and interpreting texts to trouble and spatialize the hegemonic assumption of a 
top down colonial ideology. It suggests that the texts produced by colonialists are 
influenced by those they studied, by the othered that permeated the colonizer’s lived 
experience.  
Both of these strategies, of the subaltern and the contact zone, are ways to 
disorient the dominant discourses that have structured relations of colonialism. They are 
ways of reading current texts by reinserting the voice of the homogenized Other for the 
purpose or strategy of subverting current interpretations of colonialist power. Although 
there are problems with this strategy, as there are normally problems with almost any 
theory of subverting power, it does supply an intriguing way of interpreting discourse and 
to reinsert, to some extent, a form of agency or voice. 
Dolls and the Posthuman “Contact Zone” 
In Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle, Chris Hedges 
(2009) argues that pornography constructs women as a commodity and an object of 
ownership. Extending his argument that pornography is a “bleached pantomime of sex” 
void of any real emotion or reciprocity (p. 57) to sex dolls, Hedges highlights an 
interview with an individual who keeps a doll and promotes the idea of solitary auto-
arousal. The interviewed individual’s emphasis on his control of his own sexual desires 
and needs underscores Hedges’ assumption that the doll is an object that facilitates a one-
directional act of strict masturbation bereft of emotion.  
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To interrogate these assumptions of one-directionality and a-emotionality, I 
examine two social texts: the first is a website page advertising the “Real Love Doll 
Ange: 100% silicone realistic Japanese sex doll” from the company Kanajo Toys; the 
second is a list of testimonials from the website Real Doll with customers describing how 
much they enjoy the dolls they have received. These two pieces provide a more 
complicated understanding of the interactions with dolls that are both encouraged and 
reported in these texts. The themes inherent to the respective sites overlap, but both 
suggest in different ways the doll’s transformative promise of companionship and quality 
of life. Since the love doll as an object is described through two different mediums, the 
advertisement and the testimonials, Sara Mills’ (2004) interpretation of Foucault’s 
discourse is quite useful. Foucault observes the following about discourse: 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 
‘discourse’, I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that 
accounts for a number of statements. (Foucault, 1972, p. 80 as cited in Mills, 
2004, p. 6) 
 
This is a fairly broad definition of discourse, and Mills suggests that the three distinct 
forms of discourse represent discourse from a theoretical level, to a more general set of 
discourses, and finally to the rules and structures that produce discourse (p. 6). For my 
purposes here what is important is that discourse encompasses both utterances and texts 
that have effects in the real world (p. 6). A discourse is then something that produces 
something else instead of being an isolated structure already in existence (p. 16). This 
position allows us to conceive of discourse as less of a top down imposition or as a power 
or structure that produces effects in the real world and that actors are simply oppressed by 
it. In this case, I suggest that the gendering of the dolls enables social subjects to situate 
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the dolls within a recognizable narrative of heteronormative romance, as my following 
analysis will indicate.  
Close examination of the Kanajo Toys website, informed by discourse analysis, 
reveals an intricate narrative that challenges the extent to which the advertisement can be 
interpreted as merely a glossy presentation that justifies the doll’s price tag. The Kanajo 
Toys site features several photographs of a doll named Ange, and the accompanying text 
that anchors the preferred meanings of the images contains connotations of gender 
normativity, such as masculine chivalry and “natural” feminine beauty, love, master/slave 
relationships, and nubile characteristics of the doll. Many of the images are sexually 
provocative. The doll itself is obviously designed to be able to accommodate limited 
stereotypical sexual activity, although, with the textual assertion that she “provides 
amazing sensations for your special moments” (para. 5), the advertisement suggests that 
the sensations that she offers are possibly more real than real or even better than real. 
Yet, the range of scenarios and compositions of the photographs point beyond the 
construction of Ange as a new and improved technology of simulated sexual acts and 
suggest her multidimensionality, while indicating her readiness for activities routinely 
associated with the social practices of dating and romantic relationships. In what follows, 
I will identify themes on the Kanajo Toys’ website that will enable the unpacking of the 
complexity of the doll’s construction through a romantic narrative that is primarily visual 
in its presentation but is supported with textual supplements.  
The advertisement emphasizes the doll’s inherent responsiveness to the ostensibly 
individual tastes and changing desires of the prospective consumer by foregrounding the 
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doll’s customizability. For instance, the website uses the grammatical structure of the 
imperative to entreat visitors to: 
create the love girl of your dreams (para. 2); 
change heads any time you wish and create a whole new experience (para. 3).  
 
If taken in isolation, the phrase the “love girl of your dreams” and even the earlier quoted 
reference to “your special moments” can be understood as the clever use of romantic 
suggestion as a euphemistic device that suggests the quality of a purely sexual experience 
customized for the seemingly unique desires of prospective customers with the means to 
make the purchase of what could be assumed to be merely a novel technological sexual 
surrogate. When considered contextually with the images and other textual provocations, 
the double-entendre seems to be motivated by more than an attempt to cleanse the 
advertisement. Consider, for instance, the very first line of the advertisement: “[t]he most 
realistic Japanese love doll to date” (para. 1, emphasis added). This line produces another 
double voiced play with language. On the one hand, it suggests that this new, better, and 
technologically advanced product achieves an unprecedented realism. On the other hand, 
it implies that the doll is for dating in a romantic sense. Dating connotes reciprocity or 
give and take, as well as the notion of choice or agency in the selection of a dating 
partner.   
The implied narrative of romance produced in the photographs of Ange situated 
in different settings is consistent with normative gender assumptions that shape relational 
forms of conduct and presentation, and it provides insights into the complexity of the 
fantasy that is presented to visitors to this site. The romance narrative unfolds primarily 
in the domestic and private contexts in which she is photographed, however, given the 
marginalizing assumptions that are associated with the use of love dolls, the containment 
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of this narrative is potentially connected as much to the gendering of both the doll and of 
space as it is the forces of social control that ensure that Ange will likely neither be 
seated at a table in a fine dinning establishment table, nor be seriously represented in 
public space, any time in the very near future. The photographic narrative, however, 
shows Ange to be more than an aid for masturbation or “simulated” sexual acts. Ange 
can be found not only provocatively dressed and positioned, but in various other forms of 
attire that suggest other activities and relations. For instance, a photograph hints that 
Ange might be getting ready to go out on the town as she is dressed in a cocktail dress 
with matching accessories. The viewer can imagine that perhaps Ange’s date has taken 
this photograph as a memento of a special evening. But, the viewer can see that Ange 
sometimes likes quiet time to herself as well, as she appears in a photograph seated at the 
kitchen table, wearing her glasses and engaged with a book. This signals that she is 
imagined to engage in a subjective world apart from her partner. The implicit suggestion 
is that Ange’s life has both adventurous and banal moments of the quotidian; she can be 
glamorous and mundane. She is posited to have the capacity for social interaction, yet she 
is presented as possessing an interior world that she forges in bookish pursuits. Although 
Ange appears nude in photographs, these images do not seem to constitute pornographic 
images per se; rather, they seem naturalized and relationally intimate. The order and 
content of the imagery may visually parallel commonly held understandings of the 
progression of a dating relationship; the anniversary ring that is provided as an accessory 
to the doll supports the narrative of heteronormative relationship progression.   
In paragraph four, the seven different faces of Ange are supposed to represent the 
world-renowned “sophistication and natural essence” of Japanese women. This provokes 
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two major considerations. The first observation is that, although Ange is textually coded 
as Japanese, her skin tone is porcelain, and her features child-like to connote purity and 
innocence. This underlines the contradictions at play in both the doll’s design and the 
discourses that describe her natural femininity in hegemonic terms and highlights the 
advertisement as a racializing “contact zone” (Pratt, 1991). It also produces the 
advertisement as a curious gendering contact zone that privileges a hegemonic idea of 
femininity, while subtly suggesting that, while normative femininity is a precarious 
construction for living beings, femininity is more real and more natural in the 
technologically produced doll, who appears to be more child than woman. The second 
observation informed by a critical-race perspective is that racializing practices are 
embedded into the design and presentation of the doll that reinforce assumptions of 
infantilization and passivity inherent to colonial/imperial relations of power. While the 
child-like doll may represent a more realistic woman than a living woman, the doll may 
also represent the Orientalist essence of a Japanese woman more than a living Asian 
woman would.   
The last thing to draw attention to is the “Care & Maintenance” clause that states, 
“Love dolls are durable, but, just like a real lady, they still need special care and 
attention…Also, when bending or moving your doll, please treat her with the respect she 
deserves, which means taking things slowly and not bending her by force” (para. 10). 
This denotes the fragile nature of Ange, and by extension femininity, thus not only is the 
doll’s partner in question subject to the technical and physical aspects of its form, but 
also to a moral positioning toward Ange. Note that while this relation of care may 
support the thesis that new technologies may stand in as surrogates for real living 
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partners, it also may support my argument that dolls serve emergent inter-animated 
posthumanist relationships. In either case, the references to the proper care of a lady do 
suggest traditional interrelational constructions of femininity and masculinity, and revert 
to contradictions of chivalry. Chivalry, which relied upon spatial distinctions of public 
and private, promoted the respectful treatment of “ladies” (who are positively constituted 
in relation to the prevailing moral order) and the rougher treatment of more common 
women (who are negatively constituted in relation to the moral order).  
The Real Doll website uses customer testimonials as a device to promote their 
dolls. Several of the individual testimonies suggest that the doll brings an improved 
quality of life, as each contributor describes the arrival and ensuing relationship with 
their doll as transforming their lives. This transformative process that the testimonials 
index is not merely physical but highly emotional and social in character:  
“Jenny’s presence here has had a dramatically positive effect on me 
psychologically and emotionally” - John, MA; 
 
“We are some days further now and I can say: it gets better and better. The things 
you discover… The things you can or must do: go shopping for her, taking care of 
her (washing, powdering), dressing her up, moving her,… Kissing her, caressing 
her, cuddle her, laying next to her, holding her hand, brushing her wig,… too 
much to mention” – Tom Ricard, Belgium 
 
The effects upon the customer are also related to the life of solitude that they claim to 
have experienced, and how the needs of the doll have actually supplied them with the 
needs of another to be fulfilled. Both of the above cited testimonies and a third individual 
mention that the presence of the doll has provided them with company. Therefore, much 
of this increase in quality of life is enabled through the companionship that the customers 
feel with their dolls.  
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Numerous individuals express in their testimonials their enjoyment in painting 
finger and toenails or purchasing clothes for their dream girl. For instance, consider: 
 “Now with time going by, you’ll see that these dolls are somewhat like real girls 
in a lot of ways, like needing tender loving care.” – Real name withheld by 
request; Germany. 
 
Significantly, however, they do not seem to perceive this caregiving as one-directional. 
The testimonials at times allude to reciprocal relations with the dolls: 
“She’s cute, sexy, pretty, gives me comfort and peace of mind and lets me enjoy 
her whenever and how ever I need, and all she asks in return is some tender love 
and care!!” – CJD. 
 
While Hedges’ (2009) conceptualization of the dolls offers a specific view that reduces 
the doll to a commodity, a masturbatory object, and an extension of pornography, several 
of the testimonials suggest that either the degree of the doll’s perceived happiness or the 
degree to which her perceived needs are met are of significance to the user’s sense of 
self-efficacy and happiness. While the relations of power associated with what could be 
called a posthuman contact zone here – one that is infused with racialization, gendering, 
and colonial othering – remain intact, there is an intractable sense that there is more 
going on between these individuals and dolls than isolated sexual activities. The 
emphasis on giving and receiving love and care - sometimes explicit and sometimes 
implicit – does not negate the troubling relations of power evident in the themes 
identified on these two websites, but it does suggest an emergent sociality between 
humans and ostensibly inanimate technological objects.  
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Chapter 3: Love in the Retrospect? 	  
The dynamic relationships that people have with love dolls posit new terrain for study 
that extends beyond the question of whether the dolls are purely sexual instruments or the 
possessions of hopeless and lonely romantics. A tendency to cast the demand for love 
dolls as the symptom of either a psychological or social problem threatens to obscure the 
extent to which the private human-object experience is interconnected with the realm of 
social and cultural life. In other words, the particularity of private experience is 
intertwined with the generality of social existence in a given context. I approach the doll 
not as though it were external and disruptive to social norms, expectations, culture, and 
history but as though it is inseparable from, and dependent upon, these. I will treat the 
human-doll relationship not as one in which the human merely customizes and, therefore, 
determines the doll’s attributes for one-directional utility but I will instead elaborate it as 
a relationship of interanimation.  
The topic of relationships with love dolls has received a very limited amount of 
attention, and, therefore, I find it necessary to consider some of the ethical considerations 
if not ramifications of such research that this entails. There are severe risks that exist with 
respect to ‘doing’ research, not to mention the ways that I as the ‘researcher’ construct 
and produce knowledge about others. For that reason this chapter will enlist many 
resources so as to delicately approach the life world and culture that individuals have 
experienced with their dolls, and consequently the ways in which they have been 
represented.  
Not only are there ethical considerations inherent to the representation of these 
relationships, but also, troubling assumptions are made about them that raise the problem 
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of the moral status of relationships with dolls. In other words, critics may wonder 
whether individuals who have relationships with dolls distinguish between dolls and 
women. When I have presented some of this research, I have been asked questions such 
as the following: How do these individuals treat women with specific regards to issues 
around gendered objectification, hypersexualization, commodification of and control over 
women’s bodies? Before addressing the issues raised by this kind of question, which in 
the first place presupposes that dolls in fact stand in for human partners, I want to clarify 
the parameters of the present research. This research does not aim to approach the subject 
matter through a normative lens that focuses primarily on those who have dolls. It sets 
out neither to psychologize nor to pathologize the users or the culture itself as 
maladaptive.  However, in approaching this topic, the work cannot overlook these serious 
concerns about the potential relationship between the treatment of love dolls and their 
potential portrayal of women. This question stems from a concern that the norms 
observed in the treatment of love dolls may be extended to the treatment of women. This 
is a troubling and problematic issue that demands attention.  
As observed earlier, Chris Hedge’s (2009) book The Empire of Illusion shares the 
concern that there may be a relationship between the use of dolls and pornography. 
Hedges discusses the bleached, hyperreal, and obscene nature of some pornography, and 
he suggests that the doll is a material extension of pornography. Given this, some 
attention to how pornography has been theorized will help in locating the similarities and 
differences between the use of dolls and pornography. I would like to put forward the 
notion that the doll is more meaningfully dynamic and relational than pornography. 
When we give attention to how people actually describe themselves through their 
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interactions, and relationships, with their dolls, these relationships appear to embody and 
re-represent the discourse of love in circulation in contemporary culture.  
A portion of this chapter is devoted to the ways that the online community, The 
Doll Forum, addressed and is addressing how to deal with being stereotyped and 
represented. I think it is relevant to analyze one specific forum on the website, “Dolly 
Definition: iDollator” (2010), that undertakes this process that, for many of the users, 
expresses a deep and intimate connection to their lifestyle. The purpose of this analysis is 
to show that the ideas represented on the forum help to theorize relationships with dolls 
in a different way that extends beyond the assumptions that support critiques that 
presume love dolls to be the embodiment of women’s objectification. In fact, it might be 
suggested, and this has been somewhat alluded to by David Levy (2007), that these 
relationships are new in their entirety and are not necessarily completely modeled on 
gendered human-to-human relationships.  
Not Pornhub 
When dolls appear in popular discourse, the common referents are the infamous image of 
Will Ferrell in the motion picture Old School (2003), holding a blow up doll on the front 
porch asking what outfit to put her in, and the episode of My Strange Addiction that 
features Davecat and his dolls.7 The common assumption is that these individuals are 
delusional and unable to deal with reality, and so they resort to a synthetic in-human 
embodiment of a woman. When considered in this way, the doll is assumed to stand in 
for an absent real life woman. From that perspective it is not difficult for some to make 
assumptions about the doll and its correlation to pornography. In questioning the 
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ontological characteristics of the doll, we frequently come to the ramifications of men 
who use porn and how a surface reading might give support to this correlation. Based 
upon my analysis of the conversations on iDollator, I argue that the doll is something 
more than an elaborate technical aid to masturbation. A brief consideration of feminist 
debates surrounding pornography, which could be considered a technology for 
masturbation, offers support for my claim that the social significance of dolls extends 
beyond the activity of masturbation, which is solitary and careless.   
In a pivotal piece, Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of 
Spectacle, Chris Hedges (2009) represents the cultural conditions of the United States as 
depraved and hollow. Hedges interrogates the legitimacy of several pillars assumed to 
uphold the infamous American dream, and how these ideals have developed into shackles 
that ultimately arrested America’s cultural development. In the chapter “The Illusion of 
Love”, Hedges suggests that our ability to be intimate is incarcerated by our exposure to 
pornography. Hedges deploys several different dialogues to affirm his conclusions using 
the Adult Video Network Expo, speaking to different current and ex-pornstars, and 
discussing the process of the dissemination of porn through the Internet. Systematically, 
Hedges comes to the conclusion that porn necessitates the absolute commodification of 
women’s bodies for the gratification of the male gaze8: 
Pornography does not promote sex, if one defines sex as a shared act between two 
partners. It promotes masturbation. It promotes the solitary auto-arousal that 
precludes intimacy and love. Pornography is about getting yourself off at 
someone else’s expense. (p. 57) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Arya (2012) for full definition of the “male gaze”  
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Pornography, then, is one of the most detrimental aspects of American Culture in the 
sense that the hyperreal objectification results in an inability to distinguish reality from 
pornography (p. 60).  
The Feminist Porn Book: The Politics of Producing Pleasure (Taormino, 
Shimizu, Penly, and Miller-Young, 2013) provides a rebuttal to anti-porn feminist 
opposition. The book is organized in response to the anti-porn feminists’ claim that those 
feminists who support porn are “deceiving ourselves and others about the nature of 
pornography; they claim we fail to look critically at any porn and hold up all porn as 
empowering” (p. 9). As Taormino et al. claim, the “feminist opponents of porn cast 
pornography as a monolithic medium and industry and make sweeping generalizations 
about its production, its workers, its consumers, and its effects on society” (p. 9). This 
book forwards, in general, two important aims: (1) to problematize the term pornography 
because it is deployed to describe a diverse and varied range of cultural productions, and 
(2) to highlight that there are individuals in the industry who are trying to create a genre 
that subverts the stereotypical or popular culture led assumptions of porn that currently 
only supply a small market. 
The ‘porn debate’ that began in the 1980s between those who take an anti-porn 
stance and those who take an anti-censorship response has currently been reinvigorated 
by the overwhelming amount of pornographic materials on the Internet. As the authors of 
The Feminist Porn Book (2013) note, “the emergence of new technologies that allow 
more people than ever to both create and consume pornography, the moral panic-driven 
fears of porn are ratcheted once again” (p. 14). The slogan for the anti-porn campaigns in 
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the 1980s, ‘Pornography is theory, rape is practice’9, drew a clear and stark connecting 
line between pornography and the off-screen treatment of women in face-to-face, real life 
social interactions. The conflation of the consumption of pornography and the treatment 
of women in corporeal real life contexts suggests that the women depicted in 
pornographic texts are understood by consumers as surrogates for real women and that 
the pornographic texts are assumed to be realist ones that shape consumers’ beliefs and 
conduct.  
Related to the tensions raised in the anti-porn and anti-censorship debates are 
perspectives that seek to intervene into the definition of pornography and suggest that it 
should not be studied through a moral gaze. Feona Attwood (2004) suggests this 
dichotomy between the two sides is a “tired binary” (Juffer, 1992, p. 2 as cited in p. 92), 
that does not necessarily take into account how parochial this approach can be.10 Relevant 
in this context is Laura Kipnis’ (1996) challenge to the assumption that its users 
understand pornography as a reflection of real relationships and real actions. Kipnis has 
argued that pornography is about fantasy and that others have supplied critiques of 
normative aesthetic judgments about bodies. Extending Kipnis’ observation that 
consumers of pornography do not necessarily understand that what they watch can 
instruct them on real sex and real relationships to the presumption that interactions with 
dolls may be formative for interactions with women, it might be illuminating to consider 
that arguments that rely upon an untroubled relationship between viewing pornography 
and relating with others in immediate social situations echoes the old cultivation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9See Morgan (1980), for direct quotation, as well as Dworkin (1979) for similar 
perspectives on pornography.  
10 See Kipnis (1996) for similar approaches to pornography.  
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hypothesis in communications literature. The cultivation thesis had forwarded that media 
has effects on people’s beliefs about social reality (Woo and Dominick, 2001; Ferris et al, 
2007). While this hypothesis is not as influential in media studies as it once was, it 
roughly corresponds with common-sense conceptions of the impact of media on the way 
we view and interact with the world.  
So, while the scholarly debates about pornography remain unsettled, the 
comparison between relationships with dolls and pornography is not necessarily justified. 
While scholarship on pornography does bring to light some ethical considerations that 
may be applicable to dolls, the polemic between anti-porn and anti-censorship, as I see it, 
does not map neatly onto the intimate and reciprocal interactions that people describe 
having with dolls. The debates about pornography are not well positioned to address 
dolls. Drawing connections between these forms would require sweeping generalizations 
and a firm ontological definition of the doll, the latter of which I believe remains in 
contestation. Given this, it seems appropriate to analyze human relationships with dolls 
on their own terms rather than assuming that dolls offer a material extension of the 
pornography industry. This is the point of departure for the analysis of The Doll Forum’s  
iDollator discussion board that follows. 	  
iDollator  
	  
Figure	  4:	  iDollator 
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Language has made the conversation about having a doll a perplexing task. The above 
image presents us with an inroad to that issue by way of a survey that was initially 
designed to provide a site for individuals to respond to the term iDollator and whether or 
not it reflected their interests and relationship with their dolls. The poll was set up by the 
user Midiman and has attracted a variety of responses that demonstrate a struggle over 
the language used to describe their relationships. The Doll Forum, where the poll is set 
up, is an online website that is used as a location of “discussion and community-building 
among individuals who use or admire Real Dolls” (Boiteau, 2011, p. 3). This particular 
sub-forum began on August 19, 2010 with the most recent post dating September 26, 
2014 (as of May 27, 2014); it has a total of 117 responses. For those who participated in 
what might be suggested as “doll culture”, there is a sizable amount of discontent with 
the term iDollator. What began as a simple survey that asked how individuals view their 
relationships with their dolls, turned into an emotional discussion that exposed a 
complexity that is hard to define. Many of the responses are concerned with how being a 
part of doll culture is stereotyped and consequently marginalized and that the term 
iDollator denotes unfavourable characteristics.  
Some of the respondents focus on the implications of adopting this name, given 
that the term iDollator conflates two closely affiliated words, idolize and idolater. In this 
sense, one either loves the doll unquestionably, or worships the doll as an idol. This, for 
Midiman and others, is far too strong a term of association to the doll, and in fact they 
would rather not be described in such a manner. Since Midiman established the forum, he 
is well invested in responding to many of the posts and is consequently somewhat 
overrepresented in the discussion. Even though the poll is positioned around the idea of 
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the term iDollator, many of the posts present an intimate portrayal of their romantic 
struggles. They locate particular circumstances and experiences that I believe illustrate 
how diverse many of their personal affairs are, especially how they perceive their own 
relations with the doll.  
Midiman explains that, during a conversation with Davecat, Davecat expressed 
that “he felt he did represent the majority of iDollators” (2010, August 20) and so even in 
that proclamation the discourse used here not only provides the term, but also legitimizes 
it to represent the community. Midiman states: 
I realized that many people perceive Davecat to be typical of iDollators … I 
thought … I don’t want to be perceived in that light, because I DO care what 
people think about me and I would rather they think of me as I am and NOT as 
someone else. (2010, August 20)  
 
Midiman addressed this by supplying his own working definition of iDollator,  “one who 
chooses a doll as a companion to simulate an intimate relationship to the exclusion or 
want of having that relationship with another human being” (2010, August 20). So it 
presents this interesting, and seemingly quite political conversation, of self-identification 
as a quote-unquote doll user, or owner, or lover. Even the definition is up for debate. 
There is no consensus as to what the term means, which is why this forum exists and 
something that Midiman comments upon: 
The most important thing in this exercise is to first get some sort of doll 
community consensus as to its definition of iDollator and to who in the 
community, if not all, it represents. Then at least we have a reference point to 
taking it beyond the community. (2010, August 20) 
 
This quotation raises two points. The first being how Midiman posits the idea of a 
collective culture, something that I earlier thought to be ‘doll culture.’ The second is 
coming to some conclusion about their lifestyles that would be a closer approximation of 
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these than what Davecat deems their relationships to be, essentially guarding himself or 
herself against how Davecat represents his own relationships. What then does that mean? 
I believe it suggests that there is a vast diversity within doll culture and this survey 
provides us a glimpse into their relationships.  
Username Bianca echoes this concern: 
 
One thing that is clear is that the majority here at TDF do not feel iDollator is a 
good coined term to accurately describe our community as a whole as its 
derivation leads to confusion, regardless of the fact that some individuals within 
the community have adopted it and been using it for a few years. (2010, August 
22) 
 
Bianca’s concern suggests that there isn’t agreement as to how each would define their 
relationships and that relations are different. The forum interrogates how the relationships 
with the dolls affect their personal lives; how the dolls represent or re-represent ideas of 
intimacy that are experienced in different ways. They are working to find a name that 
would represent their attachment to their dolls and what those expressions look like, but 
this discussion reveals the limits of assuming a singular identity category. 
The user Vanessa does not agree with a labeling system that limits the 
relationship to one name over another. The user claims that even after several years of 
owning a doll their relationship does not mutually exclude different terms: 
Normally, you start with wanting a doll and thus you’re a doll admirer. Then 
there’s uncrating day and you become an owner, and once you and dolly have sex, 
that makes you a doll lover. But you cannot be a doll owner without being a doll 
lover (more general meaning), and then you never stop being a doll admirer. 
(2010, August 22) 
 
For Vanessa, the terms cannot be separated to explain individuals’ perceived level of 
caring for the doll. These statements seem to revolve around the idea of affection, and 
where in which that individual sits upon that spectrum. However, Vanessa is pointing to 
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the idea that in certain situations one label may be more applicable than another and that 
they might even use several to describe one person. The terms can be used as adjectives, 
not just as nouns. 	  This distinction is significant because adjectives play a part in flexible 
description but do not complete the identity of a person, while nouns that produce 
identification can be more totalizing and assume a more coherent and fixed identity.   
Darcrivt offers insight into the difficulties of being religious while maintaining a 
relation to the doll: 
Personally, I find the term “Idollator” highly offensive. I happen to be a Southern 
Baptist (although I don’t go to church as often as I should) and the root meanings 
of idol, idolater, idolatry (etc.) are ground into your head nearly every time the 
pastor opens the good book to the Old Testament. To worship an inanimate object 
as though it were (a) god. 
 
…If you honestly do not care what other people think about you then you are a 
free man (or woman) indeed. However, most of us do not appear to be that free as 
indicated by the number of “how I hide my doll” posts and threads.  
 
Needless to say, I do not perceive myself as an Idollator. I’d call myself a doll 
admirer, soon to be a doll owner. (2010, August 23) 
 
Darcrivt’s post outlines yet another interesting position, as it not only tries to sow rifts 
between dominant and marginal cultures, but utilizes personal religious values in the 
justifications of changing perceptions of the doll as an idol. S/he makes the case that if 
religious authorities made a public claim that the doll was nothing more than a “sexual 
mastu[r]bation device” then it would be no one else’s concern. Darcrivt concludes that it 
would “be hard for anyone to call you a psycho wannabe rapist freak if you got a nod 
from the pulpit.” It is a peculiar case to be made that the doll, in this specific post, is only 
poised as a masturbatory object, and that the label would suggest that they are idolizing 
an object to masturbate with. This suggestion poses a threat to those who are trying to 
maintain a ‘reputable’ public presence in the community and beyond it, as suggested by 
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the “how I hide my doll” topic. Many responses, and specifically in Darcrivt’s response, 
wrestle with the signification that iDollator implies, which leads many to look into 
themselves and understand how others perceive them.  
[B]lindwebster (2010, August 26) thinks there are risks in labeling the 
relationship in the first place questioning “Why label yourself at all?” [B]lindwebster 
continues:  
Just call yourself a doll owner and be done with it. How far you choose to take it 
and how much you choose to share about your doll is of course up to you. No 
reason to divide everyone up into camps and slap labels on them. This is the very 
kind of thing that only serves to create tension and divide. 
 
Part of the subtlety of this excerpt is the decision of “how much you choose to share”, 
which seems to be a prominent theme in many of the posts on this thread. Each individual 
decides what to post and how much of their personal lives they include to argue for 
identifying terms. It is this disclosure that I think strengthens the notion of community 
and culture, at least at the online level of The Doll Forum. Many post personal 
descriptions of their lives; they are testimonials that unearth both mundane day-to-day 
activities as well as insights towards struggles that are not particular to doll culture but to 
very general issues. That is what makes reading these intriguing, beside the point of the 
contestation over “iDollator” it seems that the rationales and stories that protrude are 
those that expose nerves, and the subtleties of what not only brought them to the forum 
but as well some of their own life worlds. In struggling with doll terminology, they are 
participating in narratives of their own intimacies with their doll. As Carolyn Ellis (2009) 
has observed, the way that we represent relations and ourselves might resemble a 
memory of what we believe we are, or the best parts that obfuscate the ‘original.’ 
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However, I might suggest that this ‘original’ may be a fleeting manifestation of 
epistemological objectivity.    
The user NotMyName has some of the most introspective epiphanies with regards 
to his own satisfaction, need and realistic presumptions about himself and the dating 
world. NotMyName’s implicit self-assessment, which raises the issue that some 
individuals do not possess certain characteristics that are often associated with an ideal 
suitor, puts perceived social expectations at stake in this post:  
I wonder if it is not so much preferring the doll to real human interactions, as 
preferring to enact a fantasy of ones ideal relationship to settling for one that 
doesn’t come close. Many of us are simply not charismatic enough, or attractive 
enough, or (let’s face it) rich enough to garner the attention of the women we truly 
desire… (2010, September 3) 
 
NotMyName also establishes that the idea of having children is not something that he 
would ever entertain, even in the fantasy relationship he would not permit the idea of 
procreating: “I can pretend that Caley is quite content with her infertility, or if I wanna go 
even de[e]per into the fantasy, that human and Teddy Babe DNA are incompatible”11 
(2010, September 3). He strikes a chord with Midiman’s idea that iDollators choose to be 
in a relationship with their doll in preference over being with a real person that 
consequently produces a hierarchy of the value an iDollator construes towards 
‘normative’ dating patterns. NotMyName articulates the ways in which a ‘real’ 
relationship is not for him. For the moment though what makes him happy is to not 
compromise towards a relationship that would be utterly fruitless – something Davecat 
sheds light on when he explains how loneliness has invaded him. NotMyName closes 
with the following statement: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Teddy Babe’s are plush dolls that are cheaper than the silicone dolls.  	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So I guess, in a sense, I do prefer my doll, but only to being in a relationship that 
would ultimately amount to trading one type of unhappiness for another. But do I 
consider myself an iDollator? No. (2010, September 3) 
 
I think what is becoming a little more obvious is that those who partake in the doll do not 
necessarily utilize them in a purely carnal fashion, but in fact are dealing with what could 
be argued to be general issues of loneliness, and the stress that often brings for 
NotMyName.  
The following excerpts are in dialogue with each other, between the users 
Szalinski, Zarnon and Midiman. For several reasons, I would suggest that the 
disagreement provides insight into the primary inquiry: is the doll a surrogate, or 
something different? To begin, Zarnon is originally responding to the following quote 
posted by Szalinski: 
Well, if I could find a human female that is capable of feeling the true, 
unconditional love that a much simpler organism like a dog finds so easy to come 
by, then I most certainly would go for the human, of course. (2010, September 3) 
 
In response, Zarnon writes: 
 
You won’t find a female fitting that anymore than a guy would fit that for a 
female. Some of the barriers we put up to relationships are so high SuperGirl 
couldn’t jump them. Geez, if I could find someone who accepted (not tolerated) 
the dolls I’d be hella happy. (2010, September 4) 
 
With reference to Midiman’s suggestion that an iDollator is one who chooses to be in a 
relationship with a doll rather than a human person, Szalinski finds that if both choices 
were available, the choice would be obvious: human. In response to this, I might 
conclude that the doll is in fact perceived to be a surrogate. The doll is positioned as a 
locum; a placeholder to fulfill what a human might fulfill in this relationship. However, 
Zarnon believes that (at least personally) the idea of finding someone who would have 
unconditional love for them is a farce. This echoes Turkle’s (2011) concern with our 
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current relations and how we are learning to settle with the less messy and risk free 
relations over a human-to-human companionship. But, what is surprising is the insistence 
that the human partner would be required to accept the doll as part of the relationship. For 
Zarnon the doll may not be a placeholder or a substitution and might be fulfilling a 
different role.  
Midiman completely disagrees with Zarnon’s assumptions of love, making the 
argument that “true unconditional love is not something that happens but is something 
earned” (2010, September 4). He argues love that is ‘true’ must grow in tandem, and 
Midiman responds at length to Zarnon’s approach. The following is an excerpt from that 
response: 
Perhaps the reason why a dog makes such a great companion is because sex and 
hormones are not in the mix…at least I sure hope not. Usually they tend to hump 
your friends legs. 
 
However, love goes far deeper than “sex”. My wife and I share a relationship 
much like described above, and yes it did start out more sexual. But after 13 years 
of sharing we have grown very comfortable with each other… 
 
…Of course nothing has ever been normal in Midiman’s life and our first year of 
marriage we spent living apart…Some friends attribute that to being the secret of 
our success LOL. 
 
Regardless, keep in mind that when you are in your senior years that 
companionship often outranks sex when looking for a companion. (2010, 
September 4) 
 
Midiman’s post reveals several key characteristics that challenge assumptions associated 
with the surrogacy thesis. First is his marital status, which is self-reported as quite 
successful. Second, his age, claiming that he is a ‘senior’. Third, Midiman writes in third 
person, which is presumably a strategy to maintain the role he has established with his 
dolls. Lastly and most importantly, Midiman remains in a relationship with his dolls 
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while maintaining his marriage; he remains in a marriage with his wife while maintaining 
a relationship with his dolls. The point of the doll becomes more complicated than if we 
are no longer suggesting that it is a surrogate.  
[N]iah provides some insight into the possible applications the doll might have 
when responding to calpolygradstudent’s post, which inquired about the surrogacy 
potential of dolls: 
I’m curious what the forum members think about the therapeutic implications of 
the dolls, for use in sex therapy, prisons, military, for those who are disabled in 
anyway. (2010, September 21) 
 
[N]iah writes: 
 
I am disabled. I have a boyfriend but he’s much older. My female doll is a 
companion. I can snuggle her, sleep next to her. I can do whatever I want and she 
isn’t complaining or griping. As for sex, I’ve tried a double dildo with her. It 
works, and is pretty hot. My boyfriend has no interest in her, but she’s not for 
him. She’s for me.  
 
I think more people should be open to the idea of a doll. Especially the disabled! 
People assume the disabled are nonsexual beings, but they need sex and intimacy. 
(2010, October 20) 
 
This response opens up an entirely new direction when considering ideas of therapy and 
sex therapy, as well as those dealing with disability. Turkle (2011) discusses a similar 
notion of robot companions keeping lonely seniors company. In this she describes how 
elderly care might change, but has reservations against the idea when “[w]e ask 
technology to perform what used to be ‘loves labor’: taking care of each other” (p. 107).  
Levy (2007) described a situation about this with Hideo Tsuychiya, the president of 
Orient Industries. In a 2003, Mainichi Daily News quoted Tsuchiya’s on early sales:  
Early on, the showroom was more like a therapy area…We’d get old guys who 
had permission from their wives to buy dolls, or mothers of disabled sons 
searching for a partner. Nearly all of our customers had some problem related to 
their sex life. (as cited in p. 248-249) 
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The conversation lends itself to a completely new envisioning of just what the dolls are 
‘becoming’. The functionality and uses exist on a much larger spectrum than previously 
considered. Initial reactions to the doll seem to share similar assumptions: the doll is a 
hypersexualized, objectified, and misogynist idea. I believe that these stories illustrate 
that there is more to uncover than these conceptions suggest. I think that relationships 
with dolls increasingly reflect larger issues relevant to cultures today.  
SpiritfireM (2011, January 9) argues along these lines disagreeing with the 
previously mentioned user Vanessa, whose original quotation suggests that identity with 
the doll rests on a spectrum. However, Vanessa is later cited explaining that the doll, “in 
the end…is a masturbation device” (2011, January 9). SpiritfireM explains that his wife 
is quite ill, which requires that they not sleep in the same bed. But since he purchased his 
doll, Andrea, and a few others, he is able to sleep more soundly. SpiritfireM posted the 
following: 
I won’t deny that I make love to my dolls, but that is not the primary purpose of 
my girls. For me, they are mostly companions, helping me get through rough 
times with a lot of cuddling. 
… 
Many of you all here know about my situation with my real wife and her illness, 
pretty much requiring me to sleep alone in a separate room. Before Andrea, I had 
a hard time sleeping. After years of sleeping next to my wife, not being able to 
sleep next to her any longer was strange. Andrea filled that void by having a 
warm body to cuddle at night.  
… 
Anyways to close, no, I can’t agree with the assessment at all that they are just 
masturbation toys overall. They are much, much more. (2011, January 9) 
 
In tandem with SpiritfireM, I think that TG Megami makes an interesting point about the 
level of intimacy s/he has come to understand:  
I selected ‘Doll Lover,’ as I do truly love my dolls…In some ways it is a romantic 
love, but in no way would I consider my love for my dolls as a substitute for love 
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with a real woman (or man, I’m not really sure which way my sexuality is going 
just now…). There are obviously things that a doll cannot provide that a human 
partner can. The converse also holds true.  
 
By the same token, I could not imagine myself with a partner who did not accept 
and more so enjoy dolls as much as I do. I don’t know how many doll-loving 
women there are out there, but I’m sure they exist, and I’m sure I will find one 
who can accept this transwoman and her dolls for who and what they are. (2011, 
February 17) 
 
The properties of the doll are quite intriguing once the doll users begin defining both 
what the doll is and is not to them. There is a diversity of what each doll represents to 
their user and how these relationships came to pass.  SpiritfireM expresses his inability to 
sleep without his wife, or at least sleep well, and the doll fulfills that role while he rests. 
Whether or not his wife accepts the dolls for what they are may be unclear, but with TG 
Megami that acceptance is a pre-requisite to begin a partnership for without it the 
relationship is unimaginable. Between several of these posts, which seem to be more like 
testimonials, there are quite a few who are managing both a relationship with the doll as 
well as a partnership with another person. TG Megami alludes to this by stating that there 
are discrepancies between the relationships. There are elements to each relationship that 
do not appear in the other that alludes to the idea that the relationship with the doll is not 
just an attempt at recreating a human-to-human relationship.  
These posts signal that there are valued traits in relationships with dolls and, 
therefore, the dolls are not necessarily representing a translated version of a human. This 
suggests to us that the doll is not always a surrogate for a human partner, and that what 
that might mean is this relationship is of its own right. Yet, as with a lot of relationships, 
they are not all exactly the same or generalizable. Their perceptions of the doll are 
personal and amorous; they are particular to the circumstance in which they individually 
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bring life to the doll, or vice versa. Although the dolls are quite obviously similar in 
construction, the varying interactions that consolidate the relationship make the dolls 
distinct; the idiosyncratic nature beckons an argument for the diversity of each person. 
There are eccentric individuals, as we have seen with Davecat, and a few others who, 
despite the controversy of iDollator, still claim to be one. Conversations surrounding the 
idea of ‘proper’ representation, and whether or not people agreed, were the basis of this 
forum. As well we find that some of the personal testimonials exposed nerves, life stories 
of struggles with intimacy, partners, and the like. What began as a politically driven 
exchange over media representation and the broaching of the term iDollator revealed the 
innermost struggles of many searching for ‘true love’, while others sought language to 
describe an emergent form of post human relationship.   
Man enough?  
The problems raised in the iDollator forum cannot be reduced to provide a definitive 
explanation for what human-doll relationships signify or accomplish in the lives of those 
who participate on the forum. The meanings and functions of these relationships are 
context-specific. The recurring thematic that the doll is more than a sexual aid, a unique 
companion that cannot be substituted with a human partner, and so on, does suggest that 
these relationships may indicate something about current cultural expectations or perhaps 
cultural disappointments.  The scope and methodology of this project limits what kind of 
conclusions can be made with respect to the connection between these relationships and 
broader social practices, but these relationships may be consistent with the observation 
that there has been increasing anxiety over gender expectations, particularly for 
masculinity. Michael Atkinson (2011) has explained that the gender scripts that have 
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been taken for granted until recently have now been disrupted to reveal the “multiple and 
shifting realities about masculinity” in our present “ornamental culture,” which is marked 
by representation and consumption-driven self-branding (p. 9). Drawing from Art Frank’s 
concept of “narrative wreckage,” Atkinson suggests that, increasingly, men “are not sure 
how masculinity fits into social scripts, how it is performed, if it is powerful, and if it is 
appropriate” (p. 38).   
In this context, observers have introduced the concept of the “New Man” to give 
expression to “softer embodiments of masculinity” that are more reflexively attuned to 
the performance of masculinity (p. 11). The reflexive awareness of New Men presumably 
comments upon the perception of a hegemonic masculinity. The concept of hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) has influenced the way we understand 
masculinity. While this concept has shortcomings, it challenged not only the assumption 
that gendered performance is aligned with the biological sex binary but it was premised 
on the recognition that there are multiple masculinities.  Connell and Messerschmidt 
(2005) elaborate some of the properties of hegemonic masculinity, noting: 
Hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; 
only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly normative. It embodied 
the currently most honored way of being a man, it required all other men to 
position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the global 
subordination of women to men. (p. 832) 
 
Yet, they note that hegemonic masculinity itself cannot be said to exist. Atkinson (2011) 
also observes that scholars have looked to cultural representations to trace the 
characteristics of hegemonic masculinity:  
In the West, the cookie-cutter hegemonic man is a throwback protagonist from a 
John Steinbeck or Harper Lee novel. He is a John Wayne. He is a frontier ‘man’s 
man’ who embodies control, confidence, self-importance, and strength through 
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his very swagger…He is the man every boy supposedly emulates and who grown 
men envy. (p. 32) 
 
Therefore, as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argue, hegemonic masculinity is a 
presumed ideal that cannot be maintained by any singular social subject. Hegemonic 
masculinity is reinforced by the pursuit of its achievement. Regardless of circulated 
imagery that reinforces preferred models of masculinity, there is no inherent 
characteristic tied to the body that is necessarily masculine, and “[c]onsequently, 
‘masculinity’ represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position 
themselves through discursive practices” (p. 841). This means that the practices are 
embedded within social cues that are culturally and historically understood and that they 
are neither fixed nor natural.  
What is important about the actualization of hegemonic masculinity is the social 
settings in which it materializes, which means that the configurations of masculinity in 
different contexts and social interactions are distinct and multiple (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 836). In tandem with the ‘multiple’ subjectivities of masculinity 
is an ideological component in which “hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that 
do not correspond to the lives of actual men” (p. 838). Masculinity has been falsely made 
into a material existence, it is an ideological abstraction that has been reified and taken up 
by its users. The discourses that construct ‘manliness’ do not necessarily exist in 
individuals who take up these ideologies; masculinity is an archetype that is taken up and 
used to position that individual in a given social interaction (p. 841).  
As a consequence of this formulation, hegemonic masculinity stems from 
exemplars of masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 846) that are not 
necessarily common to all men. In this sense, one does not need to (and is very unlikely 
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to) embody all the traits that are compiled together to create the gender construct. This 
archetype of what a ‘man’ could be is therefore less about a specific type of man and 
more about how that individual is able to strategically “position themselves through 
discursive practices” (p. 841). However, to perpetuate the cultural and social meaning of 
masculinity policing is required to sustain the image (p. 844).  
Hegemony also suggests tension, struggle, and consensus-building, therefore, the 
test for this concept is its capacity to capture the social change implied by hegemony. 
Since historical formulations of masculinity do undergo change, the concept was not 
presumed to refer to static masculinity (p. 833). As Connell & Messerschmidt note: 
This was the element of optimism in an otherwise rather bleak theory. It was 
perhaps possible that a more humane, less oppressive, means of being a man 
might become hegemonic, as part of a process leading toward an abolition of 
gender hierarchies. (p. 833) 
 
This is a point to be highlighted because the scholarship that forwarded this concept 
anticipated that masculinity would progressively open up rather than reinforce 
marginality. About this hope, they explain:  
A transitional move in this direction requires an attempt to establish as hegemonic 
among men a version of masculinity that is thoroughly “positive”. Recent history 
has shown the difficulty of doing this in practice. A positive hegemony remains, 
nevertheless, a key strategy of contemporary efforts at reform. (p. 853) 
 
In sum, the concept of hegemonic masculinity suggests that masculinity does shift, yet 
the concept seems to have connoted a John Wayne masculinity for a very long time.  
Even so, masculinity is under revision in practice and in scholarship. Atkinson (2011) 
observes that the sensibilities of the New Man emerge at the same time as hyper-real 
versions of masculinity emerge (p. 11); the latter rely upon self-directed aggression and 
bullying (p. 74).  
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Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo & Michael A. Messner (1994) critique the “New 
Man”: “He is a white, college-educated professional who is a highly involved and 
nuturant father, ‘in touch with’ and expressive of his feelings and egalitarian in his 
dealings with women” (p. 201). In this sense, the new man ostensibly stands in 
opposition to the stoic, bread-winning patriarch as leader of the household. Melanie 
Heath (2003) elaborates on this concept, while observing how it may be racialized and 
classed:  
The concept of the New Man refers to how white, class-privileged men perform a 
masculinity that incorporates traditionally feminine characteristics, such as 
emotionality and sensitivity. Yet this type of masculinity maintains its hegemonic 
status as superior to other masculinities, because expressiveness and sensitivity do 
not necessarily challenge the structural conditions that maintain its dominant 
status in society. (p. 436) 
 
In this new formulation, masculinity seems to be less defined against femininity, a key 
element of hegemonic masculine theorizing. However, such enactments of masculinity do 
not seem to interrogate or disrupt the structural relations and the embedded privileges that 
masculinity has over femininity, according to Hondagneu & Messner:  
But the key point is that when examined within the context of these men’s 
positions in the overall structure of power in society, these changes do not appear 
to challenge or undermine this power. To the contrary, the cultural image of the 
New Man and the partial fragmentary empirical changes that this image 
represents serve to file off some of the rough edges of hegemonic masculinity in 
such a way that the possibility of a happier and healthier life for men is created, 
while deflecting or resisting feminist challenges to men’s institutional power and 
privilege. (p. 206-207) 
 
The “New Man” seems to produce emotionality as a mark of privilege, but it does 
so unevenly since emotionality remains a deficit in femininity. Increasingly, we find a 
discursive push for men to be more in touch with their ‘feminine side,’ something that 
was previously considered a disservice to a masculine narrative. But now, they are 
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‘allowed’ to display these characteristics without ridicule so that being masculine can be 
“at once about embodying a masculine confidence, self-assuredness, self-control, and 
determination, but also about incorporating more reflexive, sensitive, self-monitoring, 
and aesthetically feminine traits” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 112).  “Feminine” characteristics in 
masculine performance are, in fact, becoming the signifiers of a better, healthier, and 
more ‘improved’ man. However, this rearrangement of the performance of masculinity 
does not make equal the long relationship of subordination that femininity has had with 
masculinity; the structural foundations of this relationship remain cemented. 
Paradoxically, the performativity of these “feminine” traits in hegemonic masculinity 
seems to underpin rather than mediate privilege.  
In contrast to the concept of the “New Man” Allison Burr-Miller & Eric Aoki 
(2013) published the article “Becoming (Hetero) Sexual? The Hetero-Spectacle of 
Idollators and their Real Dolls” that analyzes the 2007 BBC documentary entitled Guys 
and Dolls. Rather than the “New Man” performing a more reflexive masculinity the 
feminine narrative that the doll users supply for the doll is used to legitimize their identity 
formation of ‘becoming’ masculine. They argue that through the relationship with their 
dolls, the men project femininity onto the bodies of the doll to actualize their masculinity, 
recreating a two-sexed system ironically in the absence of real women: 
The idollators’ [Real Doll] narratives are constantly naturalizing and reifying the 
two-sexed system upon which heterosexuality relies. Entering the contained 
environment of their homes the documentary depicts how the idollators use the 
dolls as technologies to become heterosexual. (p. 385)  
 
Burr-Miller and Aoki posit that these men, specifically the four in the documentary 
“discursively construct their dolls into women as a way of making themselves into men” 
(p. 386).  
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Burr-Miller & Aoki (2013) argue that by re-creating and projecting a two-sexed 
system onto their relationship they paradoxically bar themselves from the landscape of 
heteronormativity. By existing within “the presence of toys, lack of human connection, 
and gender performativity necessary for the idollators to simulate heterosexuality” they 
are “equally contributing [to] factors that debunk the legitimacy of their relationships” (p. 
390). By performing both masculine and feminine roles to develop a heteronormative 
script the doll user is actively involving and excluding their ability to form a 
heteronormative relationship. The dichotomy of gender normativity collapses because the 
user is required to exist within a realm that establishes both positions but originates in 
one actor. There is a legacy of hegemonic masculinity subordinating the traits of 
femininity, and their performances are a struggle to maintain that ideological structure. A 
consequence of trying to project this relationship is that these discursive practices trouble 
their own identity as heterosexual men; these individuals can never produce the hetero-
spectacle (p. 386). 
Davecat, one of the four iDollators interviewed in the documentary, lives with his 
parents in Michigan with his synthetic partner Chichan. His explanation, as Burr-Miller 
& Aoki (2013) see it, for choosing the synthetic option is the doll’s “incorruptible beauty 
and stoicism, qualities that have led to his attempts to date real women to be ‘half-
hearted’” (p. 391). In their analysis, they describe Davecat’s relationship as an “idealized 
Hollywood version” of love; a “fairytale love” (p. 392). What is of stark interest is the 
way in which Davecat explains his relationship with Chichan: 
It’s the difference between being alone and lonely; being alone is one thing, I 
don’t mind being alone at all, however, I cannot stand being lonely…that’s 
something that more people, I would hope would understand, … that’s why 
idollators have their dolls. (as cited in p. 392) 
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Given, on the one hand, the frequent appeals that participants of the iDollator 
forum make to needs for intimacy, cuddling, and so forth, and, on the other hand, the 
discourses of care-giving, love, and even family that were present in the testimonials on 
the Real Doll site, these shifting conceptions of masculine performance may provide 
insight into human-doll relationships. First, if men are increasingly uncertain about what 
masculinity looks like, this troubles the romantic scripts that are culturally circulated. 
Should a man be sensitive and express emotions outwardly, or should he be tough and 
reticent? If this is unclear, then these posthuman relationships release men from these 
double imperatives that may both be wrong. Second, the care-giving and aesthetic 
attention that the dolls require seem to call for practices and forms of knowledge that 
narratives of traditional masculinity would not have permitted. “Real men” certainly do 
not give manicures and play with hair; do they? Some traditionally masculine men might 
do so, but they would not communicate about it with others without experiencing 
negative social consequences.  
Sarah Valverde (2012) (formerly Schewe) deployed an online survey to 
understand who participates in doll culture and was released as part of her Master of 
Science degree in psychology. Entitled “The Modern Sex Doll-Owner: a Descriptive 
analysis”, her first hypothesis expected the demographic sample to be: “(a) males, (b) 
middle-aged, (c) White, (d) single, (e) employed, (f) hold a high school degree (or its 
equivalent) or higher, (g) identify sexual orientation as heterosexual” (p. 30). 
Significantly, the majority of those sampled (n=61) “appear to be primarily single, 
employed, middle-aged, White, heterosexual males” (p. 34), though it is noted that the 
results are for the United States only. In a review of manufacturers from the United States 
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and Japan (Abyss Creations and Orient Industries respectively), Orient Industries’ 
personal representative found that the average age of customers are between 40-65 years 
old, suggesting that Valverde’s suspicions were relatively accurate (at least with 
reference to age). The demographic characteristics of participants in Valverde’s study 
mirror this new hegemonic ideal of the New Man, as they are individuals who have the 
means to purchase and to maintain the doll. Most of them have a relatively good 
economic standing, although it is reported that many saved for years to collect the 
financial capital to buy their dolls (p. 35). Even though Valverde’s sample size is quite 
small to compare with the entire population, the results do preliminarily suggest a link 
between the New Man sensibility and that of those who own dolls.  
Considering the passionate struggles on the iDollator forum to define, defend, and 
to give name to this emergent relationship and lifestyle, I believe that the forum supports 
a New Man (Hondagneu & Messner, 1994) sensibility. The dialogues animate a new 
masculinity that fosters a caring attitude towards their doll partners; the significance and 
scope of this care is a recurrent theme. But, this particular discourse of care and its 
potential redefinition of masculine emotion do not question the gender constructs that are 
active in these relationships. 	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Chapter 4: A Love in its own Right. 
My argument has assumed that human-doll intimacies are situated within shifting 
relationships between humans and communications technologies. In chapter one, I traced 
how critical social theory has been concerned for some time with the changing 
relationships between representation and reality as well as with the shifting status of the 
commodity. If, as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, commodities, which for them take 
the communicative forms of music, film, and so on, can rearrange human desires and 
consciousness, then conceptions of self and relationships are tied to the forms that our 
communications take. By using these theoretical perspectives to frame the subject matter 
of human-doll relationships, I wanted to highlight the limits of liberal understandings of 
agency and self, which meet curious implications of conceptual critiques of the active 
power of communication technologies denoted by concepts such as false consciousness 
and performative affect purported by the culture industry and Turkle (2011), respectively. 
This provokes peculiar questions: What are we relating to, and with what are we relating? 
Increasing emotional reliance on sociable technologies has led Levy (2007) and Turkle to 
raise questions about authentic being, and whether or not the technology aids or dulls our 
affective abilities. Levy would have us believe that this shift in relationships is inevitable, 
and not necessarily the worst outcome. He goes as far as to require us to defend the 
ethical treatment of the robots and suggests that abuse of the technology should be seen 
as if we are hurting a real person. Turkle views this relationship as dampening of our 
affective abilities; we are normalizing and accepting the performance of relational 
emotions as if we were in a ‘real’ relationship. As a consequence, we are sacrificing real 
authentic relationships for false, but risk free, relations with sociable technology. 
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But at this point we can see the rising significance of rethinking common 
ontological conceptions of sociable technology (and of humans too). Are we to treat 
sociable technologies as if they are ‘real’ people, things that can have emotions and are 
thus able to understand mistreatment and abuse? Or are they empty vessels leading us 
with false pretenses of security in relationships? It is a question of qualifying what 
technology really means to us: is it a replication of productive relationships, is it training 
grounds for ‘real’ relationships? In order to respond, we required a step back from the 
social technology to analyze our relationship with things and objects.  
Consideration of how we foster our relationships with ‘stuff’ (Miller, 2010) and 
‘things’ (Highmore, 2011) demands that we focus on the objects that have meaning for 
us, whether these are photographs, clothing, or home furnishings. In requiring a 
discussion about relationships, a theory of objects suggested a different perspective in 
elucidating some of the intricate ways that we construct relational meaning with things 
and the ways in which inanimate things impact our movements, gestures, and 
perspectives. Taking a closer look at human relationships with things requires that we 
reject the one-directional lens that is given in the concept of the culture industry, since 
these things actually help to mold affection and action rather than reflect them. This 
theoretical discussion of objects is complimented by Basso’s (1996) sense of place in 
which we reconfigure the focus from surroundings to objects. In this reconfiguration the 
interanimating relationship is productive and, as a result, unique.  
This analysis of human-object relationships, which strays from traditional 
epistemological assumptions, suggests that the nonliving can affect the living, and in fact 
they both interanimate one another. This relationship is not necessarily a replication, a 
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simulation, a recreation, or even a re-representation of something already in existence; 
the object cannot simply be reduced to a surrogate for a human partner. It is possible to 
now consider that the human-doll relationship may be a product of the robotic moment 
(Turkle, 2011). While relational affect between persons and objects is not in itself new, 
the way in which human-doll relationships are articulated appears to be historically tied 
to the emergence and pervasive appearance of sociable technologies that ask for or 
promise to give forms of care in ways that are affectively interanimating. Given this 
historical situation, I suggest that emergent human-doll relationships are productive and 
distinct.  
Such a relationship is more than a relationship to an object; it signals a historical 
situation that is unprecedented. I am suggesting, on the one hand, that this relationship is 
more significant than one between a human and an inanimate object, and on the other 
hand, that it is not the same as a human-to-human relationship. This possibility, however, 
unveils a whole new set of problems since it is difficult to analyze something that is not 
yet settled enough to be integrated into discourse; such relationships are inconsistent with 
established language and so they require us to borrow from existing, yet inadequate, 
epistemes. The concepts of the robotic moment and interanimation provide context for 
proposing that these posthuman relationships have their own independent status that is 
not predicated upon human-to-human relationships.  
In reading testimonials and accounts of what it is like to have and to be in a 
relationship with a doll, I recognize the limits of the language that is deployed to describe 
them; this is something that I have found difficult in the course of this study. Since 
common language is bereft of words appropriate to the description of these relationships 
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without comparisons to human relationships, individuals often use a nostalgic discourse 
of romantic love as they describe, and interact with, their dolls. For them to even 
approach explaining this relationship they are limited to borrowing from the language of 
love; it is the only way they can even approximate a discussion of this that could be 
understood. The language of love is only an estimate; it is a rough and imprecise measure 
of the relationship but is deployed because it is socially recognizable. To explain this 
relationship they borrow from inadequate, but perhaps more descriptive, language to 
evaluate their relationships. The substance of this problem can be seen in the online 
forum that discusses the term iDollator, as treated in the previous chapter. The forum is a 
symptom of this considerable issue of language’s lack. The struggle over the term 
iDollator acknowledges this problem of words: it exemplifies the very fact that there are 
no words available. An individual offered the term iDollator, which then inspired others 
to affirm or to negate its meaning, as they too endeavour to explain and qualify their own 
relationships.  
What was interesting, then, was to question whether or not they constructed this 
relationship out of a spectacularized notion of love, and thus to speculate upon whether 
the described relation ever ‘truly’ existed or if it was necessarily ‘real.’ But what 
previously seemed to be an attempt to recreate a relationship using a lover’s voice, an 
attempt at having a human-human relationship with a doll, becomes a misleading 
suggestion with the induction of the problematic subject of language.  
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The “tie” to reflexivity?  
I must recognize that my access to how doll users may frame their relationships may only 
provide a partial glimpse into their worlds. By employing the notions of reflexivity into 
this project, I hope to hold myself accountable to the research process as a whole. Ellis 
(2009) writes, 
What do we owe those we study? … How should we treat them? How much do 
they have a right to know about us, both our personal lives and what we are doing 
in their lives? Are there ways to write about people that honor and empower them 
(Richardson, 1992b) rather than ‘other’ them as exotic, overemphasize their 
differences, make them appear less than us? (p. 78) 
There needs to be acknowledgement of this loss in translation, and that how we 
understand this information depends on our own dispositions as researchers, and as 
subjects produced by the same discourses that produce what and who we study. The 
following section is my attempt to produce this lover’s discourse through Roland 
Barthes’ ([1977] 2002) notion of the “figure” and complement this discussion with other 
interventions (Ellis, 2009; Aoki, 2010) that problematize language and reflection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  103	  
CODA: Alone.12 
 
Figure	  5:	  Rebecca	  1	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Barthes, R. ([1977] 2002). A lover’s discourse: fragment. London: Vintage books. Barthes argues that 
there are cultural repertoires for the image of love, and that these “figures” are recognizable but are only 
“half coded” (p. 5): “[the figure] is no more than a modest supplement offered to the reader to be made free 
with, to be added to, subtracted from, and passed on to others…its active principle is not what it says but 
what it articulates” (p. 5). Barthes is suggesting that these image repertoires, these figures that we think are 
uniquely ours, are in fact largely derived from the reader being shown what to desire in the repetition of 
images and emotions. What we believe is a solitary love, what we think is completely interior and singular, 
strangely we are all able to recognize even fragments of the figure. In the figure “alone”, Barthes argues 
that it is a ‘philosophical’ solitude as there are no major systems of thought that we are able to express 
ourselves amorously; “Today, however, there is no system of love: and the several systems which surround 
the contemporary lover offer him no room (except for an extremely devaluated place)” (p. 211).  
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Falling in love in the modern age I think has 
become devastated and fractured. In that sense maybe she 
represents his solution to alienation, an opposition to the 
disconnection from one’s own labour of love. However, 
maybe it is in fact the seduction that is true alienation. It 
is easy to follow that trail in analyzing this picture, to 
provide a moral or common-sense view of objects that is 
strictly opposed to this notion of falling in love with a 
doll, with an object that cannot have a conversation or 
share an intimate moment. But one might question, as I 
do, if physical intimacy is restricted by our digitized 
communications, or has our modern technological age 
taken something away from us? 
The image breaches the existence and identity of 
the stoic man. It is somewhat of an ironic or satirical 
image as the man sits as the foundation but is positioned 
as subject to her; he relies on her. She holds him. In this 
respect they break from the exhausted adage of the 
breadwinner to the emotionally vulnerable. To reflect on 
our own capacities I think we find inherent the need to be 
wanted, to be requested by someone else, to be liked and  
 
Her gaze looks on through 
the window where the real 
world lay, knowing that he 
must return but that she will 
stay; an inevitability. She sits 
calmly, patiently awaiting his 
next move. They reside in a 
room, weathered with old 
books and the ether of 
memory, a familiar and 
comfortable seat; a place to 
rest. He holds her as if a 
balloon; afloat with an 
anchor that provisions him 
as careless and free; “I could 
be anything with you”. They 
contemplate life’s big 
questions, how the world has 
changed around them, “have 
we13 changed?” They stare 
into each other searching for 
more – he brushes her hair. 
Emotional stability rests on 
her; she is what holds him 
together. He listens to her 
breath, to her heartbeat; he 
feels the expansion and 
collapse of her chest, finding  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ibid. The figure “truth” presents the lover as the only individual who can view the loved object for what 
they actually are; she is the only one who can truly know him, “only I know him, only I make him exist in 
his truth” (p. 229). 
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loved by someone else.  
Love and care are not universal in the sense of 
how they ‘materialize’, they exist on the broadest of 
spectrums and the actions that those entail are not 
necessarily identifiable by conventional means. They are 
specific to those individuals; meaning created in this may 
not always be recognized in cliché.14 Personal investment 
in another will always take on different forms 
historically, culturally, contextually, and he provides her 
voice in as much as she provides his. By finding what she 
needs, wants, desires, he is able to find his own.  
Lance Bangs (2014) directed a short documentary 
in response to Spike Jonze’s recent film Her (2013). In 
the documentary he questions several well-known actors, 
musicians, and others on what they believe loves looks 
like in the modern day. I do not really know at this 
moment whether or not the technology that we are using 
comfort in her hand.  
 
Sunlight beats into the room, 
warming the walls, his face 
and forearm, the floor under 
his feet. He contemplates her 
hand, memorizing each line, 
each finger, the wrinkles in 
her dress; can this moment 
last forever? He sits in 
contemplation, not only of 
physicality but also in 
memory, in the haunting of 
past and present. 
Predisposed by the study of 
her hand silence fills the 
room, are they saying 
goodbye, have they returned 
from saying goodbye to 
someone dear? They sit 
unmoving in tranquility – 
“still lovers.”15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Aoki, D. (2000). “Remembrances of love past.” Journal of Historical Sociology. 13(1), 1-9. We talk 
about love in terms of management-speak, we talk about love in terms of medical discourse or heartbreak 
and the linked remedies of healing, all of which Aoki finds problematic. The ways in which we discuss this 
do not actually get at the crux of the problem, though “[p]erhaps this is just a failure of rhetoric” (p. 6).   
15 Dorfman, E. (2005) Rebecca 1 [image]. Retrieved on January 28, 2014 from: 
http://elenadorfman.com/still-lovers/. In the photo album Still Lovers Elena Dorfman endeavored to 
photograph men and their dolls, Rebecca 1 being part of this project. Dorfman states the following in the 
section Artist Statement: “What began for me as a playful curiosity – how to photograph men having sex 
with 125 pounds of perfectly-formed, synthetic female – rapidly turned into an exploration of the emotional 
ties that exist between men and women and their dolls. This exploration forced me to evaluate my own 
notions of love, and what it means to value an object – a replacement human being, in effect – as real.” 
Retrieved from http://elenadorfman.com/still-lovers/artist-statement/. 	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to keep in touch (an idea discussed in the documentary) 
or to meet new or maintain old friendships is 
conventionally a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing other than the fact 
that it is new to our age. Albeit, I would argue, it is a 
privilege to have such technology at our disposal – who 
is to say that the emotions felt through such mediums are 
not authentic or real, rather than simply different? 
Olivia Wilde responds in this video by explaining 
that, when we fall in love, we fall in love with that person 
at that time, but the person that they are in that present 
will not be the same person forever; we change. For 
Wilde, we must be willing to take that leap of investment 
into the unknown, accepting that what we may have 
fallen in love with in that moment will likely not be the 
same in another. In the sense that we are able to love and 
be loved, I think if we follow this logic of love we 
inevitably see that the way we want to be loved is 
amorphous. 
 
Rejected and lost to an ether 
of melancholy, he has 
endured and found love in 
this.16 He has found care by 
caring. True sadness and 
loneliness is no stranger to 
him, he has experiences the 
depths of despair that those 
provide. “But you don’t come 
out of it like a train coming 
out of a tunnel, 
bursting…into sunshine 
[;]…you come out of it as a 
gull comes out of an oil-slick. 
You are tarred and feathered 
for life.”17 His despair exists 
in futility, an infuriating and 
frustrating experience in 
which his happiness is 
always in vision but just 
beyond reach. The image 
captures his vulnerability 
that bespeaks loss, but also a 
defiance to be numb to his 
own desires that is  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ibid. n. 10. The figure “heart” is deployed as a “gift-object”: “The heart is the organ of desire…What 
will the world, what will the other do with my desire? That is the anxiety in which are gathered all the 
heart’s movements, all the heart’s ‘problems’” (p. 52).  
17 ibid. n. 12. Barnes, 1985, p. 161 as cited in Aoki ,2000, p. 4. This is an argument against the medical 
trope of the ‘heartbroken’, which suggests it is a sickness of the heart that can be overcome like an illness; 
we are thus obliged to heal. Consequently, “We make the gestures because we are expected to, for we are 
players in a game that is not of our own making, and if we do not behave ourselves, we risk disapproval, 
and even the sting of sanctions (p. 4). 	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Memory is important here, not only because we 
look back upon memories, but, even more, because we 
want to ‘make’ them.18 We want that honeymoon phase 
of a relationship, the seduction of the new with no 
horizon; we want the adorable banter that bespeaks a 
level of knowledge and intimacy of knowing someone; 
we want the solitude, comfort, and respect of another and 
to respond with exuberance – I think that these ideations 
are common. 19  To the extent that they are 
spectacularizations, and that many of us are able to see 
through these deliberate yet counterfeit thoughts, maybe 
they are guilty pleasures in this way. There is innocence 
to this guilt-ridden pleasure, but an innocence that wants 
to be prolonged into an unknown period, until I believe it 
is time to move onto something different. 
reminiscent of their holding 
hands. It is this rumination of 
futility that despair holds 
where we envision 
conversations and how they 
might go when we express 
ourselves to another, how 
that would play out in our 
heads; it would be 
immaculate. I would be 
eloquent in my speech, adept 
to the context and be utterly 
exposed in my confession.20 
But what becomes sad about 
this is that we may never be 
able to have that 
conversation, to express our 
deepest desires to another, or 
maybe we have, and rejection 
ensued. In this, however, he 
has located solace within an  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ellis, C. (2009). Revision: autoethnographic reflections on life and work. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast 
Press. Ellis speaks about the process of recounting memories and experiences in her relationship with her 
late mother stating that “Of course I’m idealizing our relationship, but isn’t some idealizing good? As Jules 
Henry says, ‘The secret of sanity is to exaggerate the good of the world’” (p. 193). The claim here is to 
suggest that the way we represent relations and ourselves might resemble a memory of what we believe we 
are, or the best parts that obfuscate the ‘original.’ Consequently, I might suggest that this ‘original’ may be 
a fleeting manifestation of epistemological objectivity.   
19 ibid. n. 10. The figure “image” suggests that we torment ourselves through seeing that which we are not 
a part: “Here then, at last, is the definition of the image, of any image: that from which I am excluded” (p. 
132).    
20 ibid. n. 10. In the figure “why”, the lover is obsessed with the question of “why he is not loved” (p. 186). 
In the end, “I thought I was suffering from not being loved, and yet it is because I thought I was loved that I 
was suffering; I lived in the complication of supposing myself simultaneously loved and abandoned” (p. 
187). 	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   ethics of care. To be 
beckoned by another, to 
provide for another, is part 
of that ethics of care. 
Consequently though, our 
vulnerability has become 
more of a liability than an 
endearing quality.21 
 
He looks as if he is trying to 
memorize the moment, 
disavowing the inevitable by 
trying to heighten the 
instance to crystalize it in 
remembrance, in his 
memory; a crippling 
mourning.  	  
 
 
 
 
Titled “Alone”, the preceding section deploys the fictional voice of the doll user (albeit 
problematically) on their behalf, much like Roland Barthes’ ([1977] 2002) in A Lover’s 
Discourse: Fragments who is providing for the lover’s voice through “figures.” In 
endeavoring to do so I have utilized several theorists in creating a dialogue around Elena 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each other. New 
York, NY: Basic Books. Turkle states that in the robotic moment, where we have become comfortable with 
performance rather than genuine expression, “human fallibility has gone from being an endearment to a 
liability” (p. 51).  	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Dorfman’s (2002) image Rebecca 1. By approaching the image this way I want to 
highlight what I find to be a quagmire of representation.  
By utilizing Barthes’ notion of the “figure”, I believe I am able to inculcate 
myself into the writing and research process. The figures are cultural image repertoires, 
that being recognizable, but are seemingly only “half coded” (p.5). This suggests that the 
image we see that is recognizable is in fact ready to be framed elsewhere in different but 
recognizable conditions; the figures are recognizable because they exist in a cultural 
repertoire. The experience of the individual figures leads us to believe they are 
experienced in solitude, separated and isolated, but these experiences have already been 
coded and exposed to us through various means like literature or film. The figures and 
their associated perception that they are of private and unique qualities are actually of a 
cultural and public origin.  There are several consequences that we can draw if we insert 
the notion of figures into the context of the doll user. First we are able to suggest that the 
doll users may be utilizing culturally recognized figures in order to explain their 
relationships. If a well-founded observation, we might then suggest that the doll users are 
coding the other half, or filling in the other half of the figure. What makes this suggestion 
interesting is that the culturally recognizable figures will have to have existed for long 
enough in (what I might term) cultural memory; it has to have existed in some form of 
discourse before so that we are able to recall it afterwards. Therefore, the users are 
creating a relationship through a discourse that they have already learned.  
As part of this recall and coding through learned discourse, Carolyn Ellis’ (2009) 
analysis of recall and representation provides the pinnacle for understanding what is 
occurring here. As noted in “Alone”, Ellis is discussing her recollection of her 
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relationship with her late mother, and how she would often find herself idealizing her 
relationship. At the intersection of idealized recall and figures, I think we find the 
possibility that the figures are idealized when they are looked back upon, or viewed in 
retrospect, which problematizes memory as epistemologically objective. This is a key 
problem in representation, because while they are presenting their relationships in a 
certain way, so too am I re-presenting their relationships in a certain way. In this process 
I think we lose clarity on some of the articulation of these relationships. I understand and 
code the figures in certain ways, as much as they do so, but not always are they parallel 
which is a shortcoming that I am highlighting here.  
By illuminating some of the problematic ways we discuss such an intimate 
discourse there is (I would suggest) a space to involve the researcher as a significant 
force in this exercise. Consider how Barthes’ ([1977] 2002) figure shifts depending on 
how the subject views it, how it exists and has existed for its holder so that “[w]hat we 
see depends upon our angle of repose” (Richardson, 1997, p. 92 as cited in Lincoln, 
Lynham, and Guba, 2011, p. 122). This is both a methodological clue that displays my 
position on ontological access to others’ experiences, as well as considerations towards 
how doll users appear to view their own lives. When analyzing these recognizable 
figures, I find it necessary to be accountable to the angle of my repose. Librett & Perrone 
(2010) make an astute observation in Apples and Oranges: Ethnography and the IRB: 
“The lines between researcher and subject are often blurred in ethnography. Everything 
becomes data, including and most importantly, the ethnographer’s experience” (p. 733). 
While this project does not fall within the parameters of ethnography, their observation 
brings to the fore how instrumental the researcher is in the work that is produced. In 
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studying these “figures” and how we come to know them, the process seems to be 
intimately reflexive:  
[Reflexivity is] a process whereby researchers place themselves and their 
practices under scrutiny, acknowledging the ethical dilemmas that permeate the 
research process and impinge on the creation of knowledge. (Guillemin & Gillam, 
2004, p. 276) 
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Conclusion: Is there a future? 
In analyzing Realdoll testimonials, a forum discussion on nomenclature, an 
advertisement for a love doll, and describing a professional photo, there are several 
conclusions to be drawn. The theoretically driven focus of this project has allowed for an 
interesting dialogue between the capacities of social technology and theories of objects 
subsequently creating a unique interpretation of the relationships fostered between doll 
users and their dolls. My approach to this subject matter assumes that there is a 
relationship between the doll and its (human) partner that is misunderstood when love 
dolls are defined as instrumental objects for sexual gratification. I take the relationship as 
a point of departure and resist the normative temptation to view this relationship as an 
anomaly, a symptom of psychological abnormality, or a social problem that arises in the 
realm of the private for a select few extraordinary individuals. This approach lends itself 
to reconceptualizing the human-object relation; that the doll is only subject to its user. 
This linear analysis is disrupted when informed by the concept of interanimacy when 
directed towards objects and by extension to the doll itself. In this configuration the user 
animates the doll and the doll animates the user, which examines and somewhat refutes 
the common sense views about an object and how it can affect/effect its human 
counterpart.    
By approaching the doll as less an object of sexual gratification and more as a 
manifestation of, for example, Turkle’s (2011) concern over the robotic moment, the doll 
provides a site for theorizing about the shifting trends in relationships. The predicament 
of simulated relationships brought about through the rapid advancement of 
communications technologies and robotics has already redefined the subject, 
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relationships, and lines of communication. In the context of our increasing physical 
isolation in simulated relationships, I speculate about how the return of the physical and 
how the doll could be mobilized in such a fashion that signals the emergence of a new 
relationship. One of the intriguing difficulties of describing this relationship is the 
absence of a current or fluently understood vocabulary, which complicates how we are 
able to talk about this without relying upon older discourses of relationships and love.  
This thesis has presented an argument that problematizes both applications of 
human-object and human-human discourses to the relationship produced by dolls and 
their users. It has put forth the notion that this relationship is not necessarily an attempt to 
recreate a human-human relationship with a surrogate doll, and that this relationship is 
unprecedented in its standing and in fact a considerable relationship of its own right. In 
developing what that looks like, part of this project is also a commentary on the ways in 
which sociable technology has dramatically influenced our interpersonal lives. Following 
this observation, I seek to understand the relationships between dolls and their partners as 
embedded in our culture rather than an incomprehensible departure from it. I insist that 
the love doll is inseparable from the cultural contexts in which it circulates, noting that 
the relationships between dolls and their users, although often actively hidden, cannot be 
analyzed if it is assumed that they reside in intimate and private spheres strictly 
demarcated from general social practices.  
 
 
  
 	  114	  
Bibliography 
Aubrey, S., Cameron, J., Kimmel, S. (Producer)., & Gillespie, C. (Director). (2007). Lars 
and the real girl [Motion picture]. United States: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and 
Sidney Kimmel Entertainment.   
 
Adler, P. and P. Adler. 2008. “The Cyber Worlds of Self-Injurers: Deviant Communities, 
Relationships, and Selves” Symbolic Interaction 31.1: 33-56. 
 
Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (1993). The culture industry: enlightenment as mass 
deception. In S. During (Eds), The cultural studies reader (pp. 29-43). London 
and New York: Routledge.  
 
Aoki, D. (2000). “Remembrances of love past.” Journal of Historical Sociology. 13(1), 1-
9. 
 
Arya, R. (2012). Male Gaze. In The encyclopedia of gender and media. (pp. 195-196). 
Thousand Oak, California: SAGE Publications.  
 
Atkinson, M. (2010). Deconstructing men & masculinities. Oxford University Press 
 
Attwood, Feona. (2004). “Pornography and objectification: re-reading ‘the picture that 
divided Britain’”, Feminist Media Studies, 4(1), pp. 7-19. 
 
Basso, K. H. (1996). Wisdom sits in places: notes on a western apache landscape. In S. 
Feld & K. H. Basso (Eds.), Senses of Place (pp. 53-90). Sante Fe, New Mexico: 
School of American Research Press.  
 
Barthes, R. ([1977] 2002). A lover’s discourse: fragment. London: Vintage books. 
 
Barthes, R. ([1952] 1972). Mythologies. (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Trans.). New York: Hall 
and Wang.  
 
Baudrillard, J. ([1981] 1994). Simulacra and simulation. Ann Arbor, MI: The University 
of Michigan Press.   
 
Bianca. (2010, August, 22). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&sid=03725b230
3483d1854752e67cf0c16e4&start=15. 
 
blindwebster. (2010, August 26). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=30. 
 
 
 
 
 	  115	  
Boiteau, M. (2011). “I know just what she wants”: constructing gender, sexuality, and 
relationships on the doll forum. (Masters thesis). University of Manitoba, 
Winnipeg. 
 
Bolicki, J. and Postmus, B. (Writers),  & Fitzgerald J. R. (Director). (January 26, 2011). 
Married to a doll/Picking my scabs [television series episode]. R. Boland, J. 
Bolicki, M. Cutlip, B. Postmus, A. Pray and M. Woodmansee (Producers), My 
Strange Addiction. Silver Spring, MD: The Learning Channel.   
 
Burr-Miller, A. & Aoki, E. (2013). “Becoming (hetero) sexual? The hetero-spectacle of 
idollators and their real dolls.” Sexuality & Culture, 17, 384-400.  
 
Callinicos, A. (1989) Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique. Cambridge and 
Oxford: Polity Press.  
 
calpolygradstudent. (2010, September 21). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=60. 
 
Connell, R. W. & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). “Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the 
concept”, in Gender & Society, 19(6), 829-859.  
 
CJD. (n.d.). Testimonials: tell us about your doll! [Online testimony]. Retrieved from 
http://www.realdoll.com/cgi-bin/snav.rd?action=viewpage&section=testimonials. 
 
Darcrivt. (2010, August 23). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=30. 
 
Debord, G. (1983). Society of the spectacle. Detroit, MI: Black & Red. 
 
Devine, Z., Gluck, W. (Producer), & Gluck, W. (Director). (2010). Easy a (motion 
picture). United States: Sony Pictures.  
 
Dolly definition: idollator. (2010, Aug19). Retrieved from: 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501. 
 
Dorfman, E. (Photographer). (2005). Rebecca 1 [photograph]. Retrieved from: 
http://elenadorfman.com/still-lovers/.  
 
Dworkin, Andrea (1979).  Pornography: Men possessing women. New York: Perigee 
Books.  
 
Ellis, C. (2009). Revision: autoethnographic reflections on life and work. Walnut Creek, 
CA: Left Coast Press.  
 
 	  116	  
Ellison, M., Jonze, S., Landay, V. (Producers), & Jonze, S. (Director). Her [Motion 
picture]. United States: Annapurna Pictures 
 
Ferguson A. (2010). The Sex Doll: A History. Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. 
 
Ferris, A. L., Smith, S. W., Greenberg, B. S., and Smith, S. L. (2007). “The content of 
reality dating shows and veiwer perceptions of dating.” Journal of 
Communication, 57(3), 490-510. doi: 10.111/j.1460-2466.2007.00354.x. 
 
Foucault, M. (1972). “The discourse of language” (A. M. S. Smith, Trans.). The 
Archaeology of Language and the Discourse on Language (pp. 215-237). New 
York: Vintage Books/A Division of Random House, Inc. 
 
Gaukroger, S. (2002). Descartes: an intellectual biography. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Goldberg, D., Medjuck, J., and Phillips, T. (Producers), & Phillips, T. (Director). (2003). 
Old School (motion picture). United States: Dreamworks, LLC.  
 
Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (2004). Competing paradigms in qualitative research: Theories 
and issues. In S. N. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy (Eds.). Approaches to Qualitative 
Research: A reader on Theory and Practice (pp. 17-38). New York: Oxford 
Press. 
 
Guillemin, M. & Gillam L. (2004). Ethics, reflexivity, and “ethicaly important moments” 
in research. Qualitiative Inquiry, 10, 261-280. 
 
Hall, S. (2007). “The West and the rest: discourse and power”. In S. Hall & B. Gieben 
(Eds.), Formations of Modernity (pp. 201-227): Open University/Polity Press. 
 
Hayles, N.K. (2012) How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Hayles, N.K. (1999) How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Infomatics.  Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Heath. M. (2003). “Soft-boiled masculinity: renegotiating gender and racial ideologies in 
the promise keepers movement”, in Gender and Society, 17(3), 423-444. 
 
Hedges, C. (2009). “The illusion of love”. Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and 
the Triumph of Spectacle (pp. 55-87). Toronto, ON: Vintage Canada. 
 
Highmore, B. (2011). Ordinary lives: studies in the everyday. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
 	  117	  
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. & Messner, M.A. (1994). Gender displays and men’s power: the 
“new man” and the mexican immigrant man. In H. Brod & M. Kaufman (Eds.), 
Theorizing Maculinities (pp. 200-218).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc.  
 
John, MA (2007, November 8). Testimonials: tell us about your doll! [Online testimony]. 
Retrieved from http://www.realdoll.com/cgi-
bin/snav.rd?action=viewpage&section=testimonials.  
 
Kipnis, L. (1996). Bound and gagged: Pornography and the politics of fantasy in 
america. New York: Grove Press. 
 
Lars and the real girl [screen shot]. http://www.parp-pa-yon.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/600full-lars-and-the-real-girl-screenshot.png. 
 
Levy, D. (2007). Love and sex with robots: the evolution of human-robot relationships. 
New York, NY: Harper Perennial. 
 
Librett, N. & Perrone, D. (2010). Apples and oranges: Ethnography and the IRB. 
Qualitative Research, 10(6), 729-747. 
 
Lincoln, Y., Lynham, S. and Guba, E. (2011). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, 
and emerging confluences, revisited. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.). The 
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (4th ed.; pp. 97-128). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.  
 
McLuhan, M. [1964] 1994. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge 
and London: The MIT Press. 
 
Mendoza, D.Y. (2010). Commodity, sign, and spectacle: retracing baudrillard’s 
hyperreality. Kritike, 4(2), 45-59.  
 
Midiman. (2010, August 20). Dolly definition: iDollator [Online forum comment]. 
Retrieved from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501. 
 
Midiman. (2010, September 4). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=45. 
 
Miller, D. (2010). Stuff. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Mills, S. (2004). Discourse: the new critical idiom (2nd ed.) New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Morgan, R. (1980). Pornography and rape. Take back the night. New York: William 
Morrow Co.  
 
 	  118	  
Morrison, J. (2003). Oscar and the alma doll. Retrieved November 18, 2012, from 
http://thenonist.com/index.php/thenonist/oscar_and_the_alma_doll/.  
 
niah. (2010, October 20). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=75.  
 
Nash, S. (2012). Real dolls: a critical perspective. Retrieved from 
http://realdollamcult295.blogspot.ca/2012/06/idollator-culture.html. 
 
NotMyName. (2010, September 3). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=45. 
 
Pratt, M. L. (1991). “Arts of the contact zone”. Profession, 19, 33-40. New york: MLA.  
 
Real Love Doll Ange (2013). Retrieved from http://www.kanojotoys.com/real-love-doll-
ange-p-471.html. 
 
Real name withheld by request, Germany. (n.d.). Testimonials: tell us about your doll! 
[Online testimony]. Retrieved from http://www.realdoll.com/cgi-
bin/snav.rd?action=viewpage&section=testimonials. 
 
Simmons, L. (2010). Day 27/Day 1 (New In Box) [photograph].  In The love doll (2012). 
Baldwin Gallery; Salon 94 Gallery; Tomio Koyama Gallery; Wilkinson Gallery. 
 
Smith, D.E. (1993). “Femininity in discourse”. Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring 
the Relations of Ruling. (159-185) 
 
Smith, D.E. (1993). “Introduction”. Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring the Relations 
of Ruling. (pp. 1-11). 
 
Smith, M. (2013). The erotic doll: a modern fetish. New Haven, MA; Yale University 
Press: New Haven and London 
 
SpiritfireM. (2011, January 9). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=75.  
 
Szalinsky. (2010, September 3). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=45. 
 
Taormino, T., Shimizu, C.P., Penley, C., and Miller-Young, M. (2013). The feminist porn 
book: the politics of producing pleasure. New York, NY: The Feminist Press.  
 
Testimonials: tell us about your doll! (2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.realdoll.com/cgi-bin/snav.rd?action=viewpage&section=testimonials. 
 
 	  119	  
TG Megami. (2011, February 17). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=90. 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Toffoletti, K. (2007). Cyborgs and Barbie dolls. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & CO Ltd.  
 
Tom Ricard. (2010, January 10). Testimonials: Tell us about your doll! [Online forum 
comment. Retrieved from https://secure.realdoll.com/testamonials/. 
 
Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from 
each other. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Valverde, S. (2012). The modern sex doll-owner: a descriptive analysis. (Master of 
Science in Psychology), California State Polytechnic University, San Luis 
Obispo, California.  
 
Which ONE of the following MOST describes your doll interests? [screenshot]. (2010). 
Retrieved from: http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501. 
 
Woo, H., and Dominick, J. R. (2001). “Daytime television talk shows and the cultivation 
effect among U.S. and international students.” Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, 45(4), 598-614.  
 
Wood, N. and S. Ward (2010) “Stigma, Secrets, and the Human Condition: Seeking to 
Remedy Alienation in PostSecret’s Digitally Mediated Environment.” Symbolic 
Interaction, 33(4): 578-602. 
 
Zarnon. (2010, September 4). Dolly definition [Online forum comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dollforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=31501&start=45. 
 
